

Mass Murder and the Political Ontology of Threat

Four Indonesian Short Stories

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Lukas Henggara Nandamai Herujiyanto

Abstract

This article discusses selected Indonesian short stories on the *Gestapu* or the Coup of September 30, 1965 (*Gerakan September Tiga Puluh* or G30s) through Brian Massumi's theory laid out on the *Political Ontology of Threat*. The *Gestapu* is an important event in Indonesian history for two reasons. First, it triggered the Indonesian Communist purge which is considered as one of the worst mass massacres in the twentieth century. Second, it propelled Suharto to authoritarian power in the New Order regime. Sadly, the atrocity of the Communist purge is not widely acknowledged even in present-day Indonesia due to the New Order's massive and political use of Threat through its State apparatuses. The aim of this article is to contribute to a new perspective of the events, different from that which is used in State propaganda. The New Order's version of the *Gestapu* centers on the blind and blanket accusation against the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) as the sole perpetrator of the coup attempt but this version has been critically questioned by research and scholarship after the fall of the regime (post-Reformation era). As now fairly well-known, it was Suharto (and the Army) who took advantage of the *Gestapu* in order to declare himself as the savior of the nation amid the impending Communist threat. However, this article primarily concerns numerous literary works depict the atrocities of the Communist purge; these works of 1966-1970 are those that delivered the

most active criticism against the purge since during a brief period of minimum hegemony of the regime. A close reading of the selected short fictions invites the readers to think critically toward the New Order's version of the *Gestapu* and the Communist purge. By way of Massumi's theory, this article points out that the regime's politics of threat played an important role in the upsurge of the people's hatred toward Communist elements which led to the said purge.

Keywords

Indonesian studies, affect theory, state apparatus, Threat, mass murder

Introduction

This article focuses on close reading the literary representations of the selected 1966-1970 short fiction from the lens of Brian Massumi's theory on the *Political Ontology of Threat*. Specifically, this article addresses the question regarding the extent that Threat (following Massumi) is employed toward the abolishment of the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or The Indonesian Communist Party) and the imprisonment, torture, and murder of Communist elements in Indonesia. Brian Massumi's Political Ontology of Threat deals with part of the human affect which those who are in power profusely manipulate for their own gain.

The depictions of the killing as seen in reading of the literary representations of the four selected 1966-1970 short fictions are feeble compared to the actual event where an estimated half a million people had been killed. Seth King of The New York Times suggested in May 1966 that "300,000 dead was a moderate estimate [...] it is one of the biggest massacres in the history of postcolonial Indonesia" (qtd. in Roosa 38). Geoffrey B. Robinson states that the estimates range from 78,500 to 3 million, that broad range is partly the result of how quickly the killings were carried out along with the fact that the bodies of victims were dumped in countless unmarked graves across the country.

Referring back to the discussion of Brian Massumi's Political Ontology of Threat, Threat is affectively self-causing any action taken to preempt a threat from emerging into a clear and present danger. It is legitimated by the affective fact of fear, actual facts aside (Massumi, "The Future Birth of the Affective Fact" 54). The affect-driven logic of the would-have/could-have is what discursively ensures that the actual facts will always remain an open case, for all preemptive intents and purposes (Massumi 54). The would-have/could-have discourse in the context of this research is summarized into the jargon: The PKI has members armed to incite a coup, The PKI has the capacity to have members armed to incite a coup, the PKI didn't have the capacity, but they still would have if it could have." Threat's rampant spread of violent atrocity does not mainly result in the reality that is the Communist

purge but ultimately the “murder” of ideological, educational, political, and journalistic aspects.

This article uses Massumi’s Threat theory as the main lens to scrutinize the selected literary representations. The analysis in this article does not only deal with what is written in the literary representations but also considers the extrinsic aspects of the works. Specifically, the use of historical data foreground the analysis regarding the *Gestapu* (*Gerakan September Tiga Puluh* or The Thirtieth of September Movement) and the Communist purge. The trigger of the Communist Purge centers on the New Order’s version of events associated with what the regime referred to as *Gestapu* (*Gerakan September Tiga Puluh* or The Thirtieth of September Movement). Crouch stated that the movement was a self-proclaimed organization of Indonesian National Armed Forces members who assassinated Indonesian military-men in an abortive coup d’état. The people involved in the movement named the operation as G30s. However, the regime coined the term *Gestapu* with the intention of investing it with an aura of evil due to the similarity with the term “Gestapo.” The army, socio-political, and religious group blindly accused the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) solely for the coup-attempt. This is due to the PKI’s strong political power as well as their history of conflicts with the said elements before the G30s. Such “accusations” led to the purge, exiles and imprisonment without trial towards any Communists elements, even to those not involved in the movement, including innocent women and children. This is so despite the circulation of historical works on the G30s from researchers after the fall of the regime (post-Reformation era). These researchers ponder over that: 1) Suharto, using some military officers, was the mastermind behind the *Gestapu*; 2) the PKI and the army have equally important roles in the movement; and 3) the PKI was only a supporter of the movement while the army was the head of it. Ultimately, these researchers come to terms that Suharto and the army took advantage of the movement and by doing so, declared himself as the savior amidst the chaos. While doing so, he toppled the presidential seat of Sukarno who was the country’s first president and respected founding father.

Such a process is applied in order to comply with Massumi's literary theory which engages not only with the literary texts but also entangling them with literature's extrinsic aspects. Massumi begins *Politics of Affect* with factual data stating that we live in a world when what is yet to occur not only climbs to the top of the news but periodically takes blaring precedence over what has actually happened (viii-ix). This shows that his literary approach also covers the non-literary realm, i.e., the realm of the real world. He also uses the US invasion of Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 tragedy to further elaborate his proposition: "The could-have/would-have logic works both ways, if the Threat does not materialize, it still always would have if it could have. If the Threat does materialize, then it just goes to show that the future potential for what happened had really been there in the past" (54-55). The premise is further highlighted by the then US President George W. Bush's argument that the lack of factual basis for the US invasion of Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 tragedy does not mean that he made the wrong decision:

Although we have not found stockpiles of weapons, I believe we were right to go to Iraq, America is safer today because we did [...] we removed a declared enemy of America, who had the capacity of producing weapons of mass destruction, and could have passed that capability to terrorists bent on acquiring them [...] just because the menace potential never became a clear and present danger doesn't mean that it wasn't there...the threat will have been real for all eternity (53).

Such intertwining of the literary with the non-literary means that Massumi's theory is inevitably a product of the two worlds. Hence, this article follows his theory in approaching the literary text and including the historical *Gestapu* based on the post-Reformation era versions. Nevertheless, because Threat is already significantly used as a means for propaganda within the stories themselves, close reading becomes the main means of analysis while historical data remains on the margins.

Provision of the historical data goes insofar as it gives a better understanding of the use of Threat as seen in the works. In addition, as the

literary depictions are already by nature historical, analyzing them with historical data is limited only for the purpose of bringing a better light to the historical context of the readings. There are at least four different interpretations of the *Gestapu* by post-Reformation historians, all of which are utilized in close reading these short stories in order to scrutinize their representation of the Communist Threat. Such a process becomes contextual with the article's objective to unravel the New Order's version of the *Gestapu* through the selected short fictions.

The objective of the authors of the 1966-1970 period was to promote justice toward the victims of the sporadic mass murder by the New Order. Furthermore, the contribution of this article does not stop in exposing the mass killings and therefore complying with Massumi's theory that Threat can be used to kill and commit genocide. In using Massumi's theory, this article aims to foreground the idea that the New Order regime conducted not merely a physical mass-murder but, ultimately, an ideological one. They did not only kill the victims but ultimately destroyed a complex chain of ideology, education, and journalism connected to the PKI in Indonesia. Doing so can only be conducted by way of juxtaposing the analysis with the historical data mainly consisting of the post-Reformation versions. Historical data support the argument that the ISAs (Institutional State Apparatus) and RSAs (Repressive State Apparatus) as seen in the works are motivated by way of the propagandized Communist Threat.

General Suharto's Version of the *Gestapu*

Suharto prior to the events of the September 30 (*Gestapu*) was a senior army general who was the commander of the army's Strategic Reserve, known as Kostrad. Suharto came to power in the confused and hitherto not fully explained aftermath of an abortive coup. Whether the events of 30 September/ 1October 1965 were mounted by dissident soldiers against President Sukarno, or with the President's connivance against the army leadership remains to this day unresolved. Nevertheless, this article proposes that Suharto fabricated his own version of the *Gestapu* in order for him to generate a pretext that he is the savior amidst the chaos of the Communist

uprising. Suharto's assistant for intelligence at Kostrad, the army reserve, was Yoga Sugama, who claims in his memoir (written in the third person by writers he hired) that he was convinced that the movement was led by the PKI even before Suharto thought so. "Sugama supposedly told the doubters, 'This is definitely the work of the PKI, we only have to find the evidence,' he boasts that he was the one who convinced Suharto of the PKI's culpability, who turned Suharto's sense of foreboding into an unshakeable conviction." These events are congruent with Massumi's Threat related to the premise that "The PKI has members armed to incite a coup, The PKI has the capacity to have members armed to incite a coup, The PKI didn't have the capacity, but they still would have if it could have." Going back to the discussion related to the short stories of 1966-1970, as the authors main aim at that time was to defend the rights of innocent people who fall into death and torture due to accusations of being Communists, they did not temper with Suharto's version of the *Gestapu*. The short stories version of the *Gestapu* still uses Suharto's version. However, this article provides description of Suharto's fraudulent version of the *Gestapu* in order to give readers comparison with the post-Reformation version of the events which the latter is used in the analysis of the short stories using Massumi's *Politics of Threat* to debunk Suharto's version of the events.

The term *Gestapu* was coined by Brigadier General Sugandhi, the Director of the Armed Forces newspaper, *Angkatan Bersenjata*, with the intention of investing it with the aura of evil: "The acronym 'Gestapu,' has an obvious similarity with the term 'Gestapo' (an acronym for the infamous political police of Nazi Germany). It was constructed as acronym for the Indonesian September 30 Movement (*Gerakan September Tiga Puluh* or G30S)" (Goodfellow, *Api Dalam Sekam* 2). Any discussion of the events of September 30 in the present must start from the understanding that this is a difficult topic to deal with and that many Indonesians directly and indirectly affected by the terror engendered by the events have been unable or are reluctant to share their memories with neighbors or even close relatives. It is due to this fact that literature becomes one of the very few means to reflect on the atrocity that is the Communist purge.

Furthermore, one of the biggest reasons that justice for the victims is being hampered is the fact that Suharto's version of the movement is still the one mostly known in the country. It is for this reason that the article focuses on the discussion revolving around events related to the post-reformation version of the *Gestapu*. To sketch the essentials, polarization between the left and the right forces in Indonesia came to a head on the night of September 30, 1965 when six senior generals and a lieutenant were kidnapped and murdered as part of an attempt to establish a governing-revolutionary council. This coup, carried out by military officers, was quickly countered by other elements in the Armed Forces under the direction of General Suharto, so that subsequently, then-President Sukarno was marginalized and stripped of power as popular antipathy toward the left, especially toward the huge Indonesian Communist Party or PKI, was roused and manipulated by the military. The summary of this version suggests that the PKI played a major role in the killings of the six generals, and therefore these killings had been interpreted as a coup against the State committed by the Communists.

Post-Reformation Version of the *Gestapu*

The post-Reformation version is similar to Suharto's version regarding the role of the Indonesian Army but other than that, their narratives are very different. While both versions are in agreement that the victims of the vicious murders that night were military men, the difference underlies the fact that the post-Reformation version greatly questions the perpetrators of the murders in Suharto's version. Researchers argued and emphasized that there were some military men who led the movement, with Lieutenant Colonel Untung and Colonel Latief being the ones whom most people know about. Regarding the rest of the executioners, the post-Reformation version scrutinized the matter and found out that the rest of the killers were also highly connected with the Army. There are three interpretations regarding this. However, each of these interpretations is more significantly and strongly convincing based on the support of data and argument compared to the version of its Suharto/Army counterpart.

Indonesian literature during the years 1966-1970 was different from the attitudes of the apparatus and the mainstream institutions at that time which committed systematic murders through the so-called *tumpas kelor*: the total crushing of the PKI followers and their family (Taum 101). It is true that no literary work expressed its agreement or merely sympathized with the PKI ideology. That is why there was no counter-ideology, one that supported the Communist ideology during this period. The dominant appearance in the literary works of 1966-1970 was the equal discursive construction that fought against the punishments, tortures, and murders of PKI members, especially the innocent ones (Taum 101). Yoseph Yapi Taum expounded the literary oppositional roles of the selection of the short stories of the period of 1966-1970 in terms of characterizations and plots:

During the first five years since G30S Event, the literary world was colored with the works with the theme on the 1965 Tragedy. Several short stories on the topic were published in *Majalah Sastra* and in *Majalah Horison*. *Majalah Sastra* was a monthly magazine which publishes short stories, poetries, essays, criticism, and series. It was published by PT Interpress 1961-1964 and 1967-1969. The editors among others were: H.H. Jassin, m. Balfas, and D.S. Moeljanto (Eneste, 2001: 210). *Majalah Horison* was a literary monthly magazine which was published by *Yayasan Indonesia* since July 1966. Those who were the editors in the period 1966-1970 among others: H.B.Jassin, Arief Budiman, Goenawan Mohammad, and D. S. Moeljanto (Eneste, *Buku Pintar* 100).

The short stories selected for this article are: Usamah's "*Perang dan Kemanusiaan*" ["War and Humanity"] (1969), Kipandjikusmin's "*Domba Kain*" ["Cain's Lamb"] (1968), and "*Bintang Maut*" ["Star of Death"] (1967). These from the literary movement of 1966-1970 have been obtained from the collection in *GESTAPU: Indonesian Short Stories on the Abortive Communist Coup of 30th September 1965*, edited and translated by Harry Aveling.

Briefly, this section elaborates on the background information of these authors and their contribution on waging literary opposition against the New Order's policy of killing communists. Kipandjikusmin is actually

a pseudonym derived from “Kusmin,” his father’s name, “Panji,” his grandmother’s, and “Ki,” an appendage to the name because it sounds nice (Aveling, *GESTAPU* 109). Commonly known to his friends as Tono and renowned for his oppositional roles through his literary works against the New Order, Kipandjikusmin is widely known for his short story, “*Langit Makin Mendung*” [“The Sky Grows Darker”] which caused its publisher to be imprisoned for two years (Aveling, *GESTAPU* 109).

Usamah has an interesting background as he influenced two salient organizations, namely the *KAMI* and *KAPPI*, that had opposed the PKI and turned them into those that defended the Communists’ rights: “In 1965 he was appointed to be the chairman of *KAPPI* (*Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia* or The Action Union of the Indonesian Students) in Solo, later he worked as a journalist for Daily *KAMI*, Jakarta” (Taum 319). Prior to Usamah’s deeds, both *KAMI* and *KAPPI* were strongly against the PKI: “The action unit appeared, starting from Jakarta which demanded the dispersal of PKI. There were *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* (*KAMI* or The Indonesian Students Action Unit), and the *Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia* (*KAPP* or The Indonesian Students Action Unit)” (Taum 147).

The stories selected in this article are noteworthy for three reasons. First, Aveling’s introduction to the stories was somewhat compliant with the Army’s version of the *Gestapu* while at the same time daringly opposed to the policy of purging innocent Communists. However, it should be noted that Aveling also stated his doubts about the Army’s version saying, “Whether these stories are true or not is not important. What is important is that [...] they were believed by millions of people and by the army. This was one of the major causes of revulsion against the PKI” (*GESTAPU* iii). Regardless of these doubts, the fact that the authors’ intention is greatly humanistic without any political tendencies whatsoever remains unchanged. This humanitarian intention motivates the writers’ opposition toward the abhorrent policy without having to be supportive of the PKI or Communism (or its political intentions).

Second, the set of stories is one of the few published English translations of the short stories with good quality available, at least based my own

findings. Third, the plots, themes, and characters of the short stories (i.e., the descriptions of the protagonists and antagonists) are very relevant to the discussion of this thesis or hypothesis which seeks out the portrayal in the short stories of the Communists who become victims of the antagonistic State apparatuses as pointed out in Massumi's "Political Ontology of Threat." Such a way of depiction becomes a path toward reaching the article's objective which is to promote justice for those victims.

Most of the victims of the atrocity are indeed those who did not engage themselves directly with the *Gestapu*. They were victims of the "power play" conducted by the regime. It is an excessive abuse of power brought out through the Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses. Some stories tell that not only were they the victims of murder conducted not only by the RSA such as the military or police officers but by civilians, too. This highlights the fact that the ISAs such as the cultural, journalistic, broadcasting, and educational sectors succeeded immensely in inciting the Communist threat propaganda:

Through the points of views [sic] which were dominated by the views from non-PKI figures, most of the men of letters refused the logics of the brutal genocide towards the PKI people. The genocide refusal was based on four humanistic reasons: [1] the PKI character was one of the closest members of the family (a brother in law) who took part in the killing; [2] that the murdered PKI women were innocent, the guilty ones were their husbands; [3] the person was really a member of a PKI mass organizations (*Lekra* and *CGMP*) but only participated a little in the organizations and has resigned from it too; [4] the people, who were alleged as being PKI, in their daily lives worked as good teachers, good doctors, good close friends who never committed crimes at all (Taum 103).

For these reasons, these writers conducted their oppositional roles against the injustice by writing short stories depicting the murdered PKI members as the heroes of the story while the murderers from both the State Apparatuses and from various elements of the civilian population were depicted as the antagonists:

The short stories with the theme 1965 Tragedy had the same attitude and perspective that the mass anger as the result of *G30S* Event happened so deeply and widely. In general, such mass anger was caused by the narrations about the event at Lubang Buaya. The mistakes (*hamartia*) accused against the PKI people caused society to commit acts of cruelty and vengeance. Brutalities toward the PKI women and the children were caused by the mistakes (*hamartia*) of the Gerwani who performed the ritual which was the *Harum Bunga* (fragrant flower) dances, mutilated the faces, bodies, and penises of the generals (Taum 115).

“The Indonesian literature published during 1965-1970 gave many witnesses about the brutality and cruelty of the soldiers and civilians who killed the Communists as the result of the 1965 Tragedy” (Taum 115-116). The literature portrayed the Communist purge as a grave tragedy in which the setting was similar to that of wars between people amongst themselves. The fact that it was a tragedy committed by people of one nation is, to some extent, akin to a civil war. The event itself—the kidnapping, tortures, and the killing of six generals and an officer of the Indonesian army—did not attract the writers; rather, their attention was related to the tragedy which happened as a consequence of the event—the cruel and brutal murders against Indonesians by Indonesians. The humanity perspective comes immensely into play in the short stories due to the fact that the authors highlight the atrocities where females and minors become victims. Thus, these short stories tried to give structure toward understanding the event: what really happened, why people could change to become so brutal toward other people including their own family members (Taum 115-116).

Indiscrimination in killing one’s own family members was an actual gruesome historical fact during the times of the Communist purge. These murders of family members are graphically portrayed in the literary representations as a way for the authors to highlight the extremely horrific effects of the made-up Communist threat by the regime. Acts of indiscriminate killings were reaching the point that compelled an individual to kill one’s own family member. These were real graphic historical tragedies that actually happened in the country: “In fact, the killers and their victims were not only from the same broad ethnic and religious group; they were

often from the same village, the same neighborhood, and sometimes even the same family. Thus, with some exceptions (including the attacks against Chinese Indonesians), the perpetrators were not distinguished from their victims by virtue of ethnicity, race, or religion” (Robinson 132).

As the oppositional literary representations of 1966-1970 have clear intentions to propagate a new perspective of the Communist purge from the side of the victims, clear descriptions of the events which took place are presented graphically to incite sympathy, pity, or other emotional outbursts:

How were the description of the brutality and cruelty of the murders of the PKI people? The PKI people were killed without being put to trial at the court, their bodies were thrown chaotically into the rivers and the paddy fields [...] a considerably little less inhumane punishment [compared to the other punishments] occurred when the accused were told to dig their own graves, then they would be hanged with their legs swung to and fro above the holes, and finally they were shot and buried [...] At that time, many of the prisoners who actually had to be “secured” or imprisoned, were killed [...] there was no real secure place for them (Taum 117).

These are the effects of the spread of hatred against the Communists, Communist sympathizers, and family members. On the other hand, negative effects equally usurped to the perpetrators of the atrocities as well:

The tortured behavior of the perpetrators highlighted in Oppenheimer’s films *The Act of Killing* and *The Look of Silence* are cases [sic] in point, but the same symptoms—such as nightmares, physical illness, psychological disturbance, domestic violence, and substance abuse—may be observed in the memoirs, fictionalized accounts, and testimonies of perpetrators and bystanders across the spectrum of such circumstances (Robinson 300).

Another highlight that the authors elaborated on is the fact regarding the State apparatuses. In the 1966-1970 literary works, the power apparatuses performing the roles of “agents of murder” toward the PKI members are the soldiers. There were also other apparatuses such as “regents, village chiefs, and policemen who appears [sic] dominantly playing the roles of the perpetrators” (Robinson 73-74).

Usamah's "*Perang dan Kemanusiaan*" ["War and Humanity"] shows very evidently the role of the State apparatuses particularly the RSA as the setting is in the prison and the main character's conflict is against his fellow security officers. The conflict arises as the protagonist is also forced to conduct his duty as one of the security guards to kill and subdue all Communist convicts including those very dear and close to him.

Both of Kipandjikusmin's selected works namely "*Domba Kain*" ["Cain's Lamb"] and "*Bintang Mau*" ["Star of Death"] also voice the same tone regarding the tensions between the main characters against the State apparatuses. In "Star of Death," the conflict is evident since the main character is a PKI member himself named Ktut Geria and his adversaries are the anti-PKI mass and a seemingly angry old rival of his named Gde Naja, an old student of his whom he kicked out of school for being anti-Sukarno. "Star of Death" may have its neutrality dealing with the theme of oppositions between the main characters against the State apparatuses since it depicts Ktut Geria who, instead of being killed, kills Naja out of self-defense. Regardless, Ktut still becomes the victim in this story since in the end, he becomes the most wanted criminal in the entire country.

A far more explicit theme than the conflict between the main characters and the State apparatuses is shown in Kipandjikusmin's other work, "Cain's Lamb," where the role of the RSA is greatly imminent. This imminent threat is due to the fact that the RSA's target of murder includes elements within the State apparatus itself, specifically the military. The main character Karno is a soldier sent by the Indonesian government to help Sarawak's People's Liberation Army, a communist insurgency movement, to attack the Malaysian government. He becomes a subject of turmoil due to the RSA having to kill Karno's family since they are part of the PKI. The killings still occur despite the fact that Karno went compliantly to war as assigned by the government and despite his leader Major Suyatman and Regent Piet Sudjono promising the security of his family.

During the early years of the regime's dictatorship of the country, literature was still relatively free to express the writers' weariness regarding the Communist purge in the sense that the regime let these stories go public

even while controlling the general public sphere. This period is different from subsequent periods particularly starting from the 1970s until the fall of Suharto when the regime's Communist Threat propaganda also propagated culture, education, and the mass media rampantly as mentioned previously.² Literary oppositions were conducted in the early days of the dictatorship since the regime's hegemony was only relatively minimal. In this period, the literary discursive domain was seen to have freedom and autonomy in speaking the writers' thoughts (Taum 281). The term "minimum hegemony" is actually borrowed from Gramsci. Yapi elaborates:

It could be concluded that the relationship, among the discursive domains at the period of 1966-1970, is the relationship of the oppositional domain. The dispute of the discursive domains of the literary texts toward political memory of the authority through non-literary texts at this period showed that the hegemony of the New Order government has not reached its totality yet [...] in reference to Gramsci's theory, hegemony at this period was in the state of a minimum hegemony (Taum 118).

The quote describes the challenges that the oppositional literary movement had to face: the massive and rampant conducts of the ISA and RSA by the government during the period. Despite the fact that the regime's hegemony is still at a minimum level, the government already began to be aware of upcoming threats. The literary oppositions' efforts, although feeble, were not without results. One of the significant results is that society started to become critical of Suharto's *Gestapu* as they questioned its authenticity when the New Order had just begun its establishment:

When G30S event was calmly analyzed, the autopsy result of the bodies was accurately reviewed again, people understood that not all information that came from *Berita Yudha* and *Angkatan Bersenjata* was correct. One of the doctors involved in the autopsy of the generals' bodies, Dr. Arif Budianto, witnessed as follows: Outside, we have heard the horrible news of the condition of the victims' penises. That's why, we examined more details. But, what we found, instead, was a condom in one of the victim's pocket. He was not a general. There was also a victim who was not circumcised. We examined the penises of the victims carefully. Let alone they were chopped

even there was no cut wounds. We examined the truth; and I dared to say that it was right. Those were the facts. One thing: about the eyes which were pried up, there was an eye that was pried up because of the body's condition, even there were hanging eyes. But, that was caused by the fact that the bodies were soaked in the water for three days, and not because of being pried up by force. I have examined them in details, the edge of the eyes and the bones around the eyes, whether or not there any bones hurt. I did not find them (Taum 113).

Another unraveled truth opposing the falsehood of Suharto's *Gestapu* refers to the news about the dances conducted by the Gerwani during the killing of the Generals in Lubang Buaya. All news about the *Harum Bunga* Dances with the song *Genjer-genjer* were also not true (Taum 113). The Suharto regime's story—that the seven officers were tortured and mutilated by crowds of ecstatic PKI supporters while women from Gerwani (the Indonesian Women's Movement) danced naked—was an absurd fabrication by psychological warfare experts (Roosa 40):

The presence of Gerwani at Lubang Buaya was still questioned. The presence of male and female volunteers at Lubang Buaya was also questioned. From various news, including the description in the film *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, people were given the impression that the male and female volunteers were trained at Lubang Buaya were surely for the preparation to kidnap and kill the generals on September 30, 1965. Several researchers even did not see their trainings as an effort to prepare for the coup d'état, but it was intended to support Soekarno's political projects in the confrontation against Malaysia. They were a small portion of 20 million volunteers who wanted to support Soekarno's invitation to seize West Papua [1962] and to crush Malaysia [1964-1965]. The training of the volunteers at Lubang Buaya was in parallel with what was proposed by President Soekarno about the founding of the Fifth Force which was supported by PKI but refused by the TNI. According to the document of the Military Headquarter [1995], it was said that there were 3,700 people being trained at Lubang Buaya divided into five batches. The first batch lasted around 7-10 days (Taum 113-114).

The facts show that the literary opposition of 1966-1970 really did bring results. The oppositions became an early wake-up call for people to start questioning the regime's propaganda of Threat. However, the good inten-

tion which brought the equally good results of the work of these authors was short-lived as the regime became more defensive in their next period of hegemony.

Affect Theory: *The Political Ontology of Threat*

To understand *Political Ontology of Threat*, it is necessary to understand its mother theory which is the Affect Theory, a theory that is focused on the body: “[a]ffect is found in those intensities that pass body to body (human, nonhuman, part-body, and otherwise), in those resonances that circulate about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds” (Gregg and Seigworth, “An Inventory of Shimmers” 1). Affect deals mainly on the body and its relation to other bodies:

Affect can be understood then as a gradient of bodily capacity—a supple incrementalism of ever-modulating force-relations—that rises and falls not only along various rhythms and modalities of encounter but also through the troughs and sieves of sensation and sensibility, an incrementalism that coincides with belonging to compartments of matter of virtually any and every sort (Gregg and Seigworth 2.)

The definition extends to the point that it expands and becomes a theory that deals with the relation between bodies with the world as a whole and the study of observing the product of the encountering between the two: “Affect marks a body’s belonging to a world of encounters or; a world’s belonging to a body of encounters but also, in non-belonging, through all those far sadder (de)compositions of mutual in-compossibilities” (Gregg and Seigworth 1). It also deals with the fact that affect is a potential and capability of the body; it deals with the study of one of the body’s main genuine potential: “In this ever-gathering accretion of force-relations (or, conversely, in the peeling or wearing away of such sedimentations) lie the real powers of affect, affect as potential: a body’s capacity to affect and to be affected” (Gregg and Seigworth 1.) Affect may be distinguished with cognition or the mental process; in fact, the two are actually inseparable: “In practice, then, affect and cognition are never fully separable—if for no other reason than that thought is itself a

body, embodies” (Gregg and Seigworth 2-3). As such, affect as a part of the world and something that we always possess cannot release itself from being affected by the things outside of the body. One of these is politics. Regardless of these things, it seems that affect can still preserve its neutrality despite such circumstances:

As much as we sometimes might want to believe that affect is highly invested in us and with somehow magically providing for a better tomorrow, as if affect were always already sutured into a progressive or liberatory politics or at least the marrow of our best angels, as if affect were somehow producing always better states of being and belonging—affect instead bears an intense and thoroughly immanent neutrality (Gregg and Seigworth 10.)

Affect possesses its own type of neutrality, something that is incomparable to any other form of neutrality; it is an affective neutrality, something distinctive from a so-called “grayness”: “The neutral, is not synonymous in the least with ready acquiescence, political neutrality, a lapse into grayness; in short, it does not imply a well-nurtured indifference to the present, to existing conditions” (Gregg and Seigworth 10). The neutral has a particularly unique function which is genuinely belonging to the affect: “The neutral works to ‘outplay the paradigm’ of oppositions and negations, and also guarding against the accidental consolidation of the very meaning that the Neutral (as ‘ardent, burning activity’) seeks to dissolve” (Gregg and Seigworth 9). The neutrality of the affect, however, has its limitations and it is limited between two entities: “The neutral is not bound to the formed/formal matters of space or time nor has it anything to do with the axes and abrupt angles of structuralism, but only the relation between two moments, two spaces or objects (Gregg and Seigworth 9).

Despite the discussion of the neutrality aspect of the affect, it cannot be released from its political element: “This is the first sense in which the process philosophy take on affect carries a political dimension: what it is primarily about is change. The concept of affect is politically oriented from the get go” (Massumi viii-ix). As life is vigorously marred with politics, our bodies inevitably become part of it, and this eventually effects our affects.

This is to say that affect, albeit its neutrality, becomes inevitably political: “Affect is proto-political, it concerns the first stirrings of the political, flush with the felt intensities of life, its politics must be brought out” (Massumi viii-ix).

The discussion of the political within the affect is congruent to the discussion of Massimo’s *Political Ontology of Threat* which this article applies in the reading of the Communist purge as depicted in the four short stories: “We live in times when what is yet to occur not only climbs to the top of the news but periodically takes blaring precedence over what has actually happened” (Massumi, “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 52). Such a situation portrays definitively how the Suharto’s regime used Threat through the media in order to incite a desired effect—a Threat effect: Threat is from the future... the uncertainty of the potential next is never consumed in any given event [...] self-renewing menace potential is the future reality of Threat [...] Threat is not real in spite of its nonexistence, it is superlatively real, because of it (Massumi 53).

Some recurring events indicate that leaders of the world utilize Threat in order to gain a particular interest. This explains why Suharto’s trick involving the Communists and the generals is very similar to that of US President George Bush’s when he declared a preventive action against terrorism and a counterattack after the 9/11 tragedy—invading Iraq instead of Afghanistan as everyone had expected. Bush goes on to argue that the lack of factual basis for the invasion does not mean that he made the wrong decision:

Although we have not found stockpiles of weapons, I believe we were right to go to Iraq, America is safer today because we did [...] We removed a declared enemy of America, who had the capacity of producing weapons of mass destruction, and could have passed that capability to terrorists bent on acquiring them [...] Just because the menace potential never became a clear and present danger doesn’t mean that it wasn’t there...The Threat will have been real for all eternity (Massumi 53).

Threat's unique and mostly abused characteristic is the quality of not needing to have an actual mode of existence and to comply with the limitations of time and space: "Threat does have an actual mode of existence: It is the felt reality of the non-existent, looming present as the affective fact of the matter [...] a Threat that does not materialize is not false; it has all the affective reality of a past future, truly felt" (Massumi 54). This is the reason why Threat is highly used in many events particularly the political ones. The disbandment from the limit that is time is the reason why the Threat of the Communist uprising is used in two different periods: Suharto's period against Sukarno and today's Indonesia led by Joko Widodo: "Threat is affectively self-causing [...] any action taken to preempt a Threat from emerging into a clear and present danger is legitimated by the affective fact of fear, actual facts aside" (Massumi 54).

In fact, in the presidential election of April 17, 2019, the political enemy of the incumbent president Joko Widodo, Prabowo Subiyanto, the son-in-law of Suharto and a former member of the *Kopassus* (*Komando Pasukan Khusus* or The Army's Special Force), used a similar strategy against Widodo. Along with his cronies, Prabowo used social media and other events such as social gatherings to commemorate the *Gestapu* according to Suharto's version. In addition, the aforementioned *Resimen Penggepur Kilat Angkatan Darat* (RPKAD)—a command troop involved in destroying *G30S* several hours after the Lubang Buaya event,³ is now known to be *Kopassus* in which Prabowo used to be a member. His supporters rampantly propagated the Communist uprising issue during their campaign and even accused Joko Widodo of being a Communist, a Communist party member, and a descendant from Communist bloodlines. This shows that at least half of the population of Indonesia, especially those that supported and believed Prabowo, are still misinformed about the *Gestapu* or have not been enlightened by the post-Reformation facts about the purge. Indonesia's current political situation, which is similar to the times during the Communist purge, makes this study even more relevant. The points here contextualize the problems of the country's current issues.

Despite being a target of slander by the opposition and the rampant accusations that he is a PKI member or that he has a hidden agenda to revive the long destroyed Communist Party, Joko Widodo won Indonesia's 2019 presidential election. Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin secured 85,607,362 votes (55.50%) in the presidential election and were inaugurated on October 2019 as the President and the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia for the 2019-2024 period ("KPU Names Jokowi...").

Widodo's case is indeed the most contextual and relevant proof that the PKI propaganda is still an issue in the country. Widodo represents the ideas of Sukarno since he is a member of the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* [Indonesian Democratic Party] or PDI, a party established by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno. PDI itself follows the ideals of the PNI or *Partai Nasional Indonesia* [Indonesian National Party], a party which was established by Sukarno himself during Indonesia's time of struggle to gain independence from the Dutch. Slanders and accusations of his being a PKI member were calmly responded to by Widodo:

I have to respond to some issues lately saying that I am a PKI member, if such an issue was ignored and if I had not given an explanation, then it would have spread everywhere [...] Jokowi said he was born in 1961, and the PKI rebellion had taken place in 1965 [...] Hence, how was it possible for an infant to join the PKI?" Such accusations go further to the extent that his father was also accused of being a PKI member, he noted (Dwinanda, "I am not a PKI member...").

Widodo's case clearly shows that the utilization of the PKI propaganda in Indonesia's politics is still widespread in present-day Indonesia. Although not directly, but the fact that 45% of the country's electorate voted for Jokowi's rival, Prabowo Subiyanto, shows that there is still a high percentage of Indonesians who believe the PKI issue in today's Indonesia.

Another upsetting issue related to the PKI propaganda is that the Indonesian Army still engages in the New Order habits, one of which is shown through the initiative to watch the *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* movie: "A suggestion by former Indonesian Military (TNI) commander Gatot

Nurmantyo to the military to hold a screening of the film when he was still TNI commander last year, Gatot ordered military personnel to watch the movie” (Ramadhani, “Amnesty says TNI...”). This sad news is proof that there are still many Indonesians who are still in the dark when it comes to the exposure of the post-Reformation era version of the *Gestapu* or worse, they purposely maintain such condition in order for them to execute a certain tacit agenda: “Amnesty International Indonesia has emphasized that many elites and parties often amplify issues related to the now-defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) or communist movement” (Ramadhani, “Amnesty says TNI...”). These are the elaborations which indeed confirm that Suharto’s ISA and RSA succeeded in propagating their interpretations of the *Gestapu* to the country. It is so prevalent that it has been instilled and ingrained in the country for so long due to the effectiveness of works of the semiosis established by the regime.

Nonetheless, the fact that Jokowi who represents Sukarno’s ideals and as a continuation of his dreams for the country is in power today offers a breathing space for the country to slowly realize its past mistakes regarding the Communist purge.

The supposed danger of the Communist uprising is very much congruent to this theory since people are made to believe as though the Threat is real—albeit without the existing proofs. These grow into preemptive acts even with the lack of evidence. In turn, the uprising brings far more violence compared to the Threat itself: “Preemptive logic is based on a double conditional: would have, could have” (Massumi 54-55). Suharto’s logic to legitimate violence against the Communist involves promoting himself and his cronies as the heroes of Indonesia who saved the people from the Communists’ hands. But the people were brainwashed to believe that it is because of Suharto’s and his friends’ deeds that Indonesia is safe from the Communists’ rampage. All this started with Suharto taking one small step—betray his own military men and murder them cold-bloodedly. The next step taken is to blame this tragedy on the PKI by showing that the “[p]resent Threat is logically recessive, in a step-by-step regress from the certainty of actual fact” (Massumi, “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 54-55).

People did not question Suharto's propaganda because it is the affective that is at play: people do not question why Suharto does not leave any space to question any other versions or loopholes aside from his own. The oscillation of using Threat motive by going back to the past coup d'etat and its potential future Communist total upheaval Threat causes a logical disjunction between the Threat and observable present (Massumi 54-55). Everyone's eyes were so poised at the Lubang Buaya that no one paid attention to actual facts as opposed to what Suharto had been propagandizing. A logical disjunction comes from asking the questions: Why did the Communists not retaliate against their murderers? Why did they not fight back against the civilians? Why were the Communists not heavily armed just as Suharto's regime accused them to be?: "The affect-driven logic of the would-have/could-have is what discursively ensures that the actual facts will always remain an open case, for all preemptive intents and purposes" (Massumi 55):

Classical Doctrine: This allows preemptive action in cases where there is a "clear and present danger" of attack. DEFENSE in the face of ACTUAL DANGER [...] Neoconservative Doctrine: This justifies offensive action against threats that are not fully emergent, or, more radically, that have not even begun to emerge [...] OFFENSE without ACTUAL DANGER; the legitimation of preemptive action may falter because of the lack of actual facts (Massumi 56).

One that Suharto launched was clearly a nonconstructive doctrine. Its time of falter was when the entire regime itself had fallen; thirty years after its propaganda:

The could-have/would-have logic works both ways [...] If the Threat does not materialize, it still always would have if it could have [...] If the Threat does materialize, then it just goes to show that the future potential for what happened had really been there in the past

[...]

On the domestic front, the actions set in motion in response to the Threat are of the same kind and bring on many of the same effects as would have

accompanied an actual danger [...] Defensive preemptive action in its own way is as capable as offensive preemptive action of producing what it fights” (Massumi, “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 56-57).

As the Threat of Communist insurgency is supported by the Lubang Buaya tragedy, not only civilians or commoners were affected by the propaganda but even the State was equally influenced: “An alarm may determine the generic identity of a potential Threat, without specifically determining the actual identity of the objects involved. The affective reality of Threat is contagious” (Massumi 67). Sukarno, under the insistence of Suharto, signed the *Supersemar*—a letter which not only gives Suharto the authority of command but also the chance he needed to imprison Sukarno. The supposed preemptive logic incited via Threat creates an equally destructive consequence which it was actually trying to prevent (Massumi 59). This infers that Sukarno, a victim of the affect, not only gave his presidency to the person who caused trouble in the first place but also allowed that person to make him a scapegoat as the perpetrator of the trouble: “The affective tainting of objects or bodies implicated in a Threat event can go so far as to functionally substitute the affective fact of the matter for what is accepted as actual fact” (Massumi 67). This is the reason why Suharto’s version of the *Gestapu* is preserved and marred for decades in Indonesia’s history. This is congruent with the saying that a lie can eventually replace the truth if it spreads unchecked and is rapidly imposed: “The preemptive actions taken in response to the Threat are still logically and politically correct if they are commensurate with the urgency of Threat; the measure of an alert’s correctness is the immediacy and specificity of the preemptive actions it automatically triggers” (Massumi, “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 67).

Suharto’s plan was carried out successfully. Sukarno and the Indonesian people reacted precisely in the way Suharto wanted them to. During that period, Sukarno and the people did not know of Suharto’s hidden plan; all they knew was that a party with millions of members was planning an insurgency and they had to act preemptively about it: “The value of the alert is measured by its performance” (Massumi 59). Suharto knew what was at

stake and that in order to convince people of the Communist Threat, he had to “perform” the things that he had done—one of these is the killing of the generals: “Preemption is a mode of power that takes Threat, which has no actual referent, as its object” (Massumi 59). No actual referent in the *Gestapu*’s case is clearly based on the fact that the PKI had no reason to incite insurgency at all since Sukarno’s leadership already accommodated their political beliefs. They already had power without having to stage a coup: “Threat alerts are quick to form their own iterative series, which proliferate robustly because of the suppleness and compellingness of the affective logic generating them” (Massumi 60). Affective logic is clearly taking the upper hand as Suharto finally takes control of the country, declaring himself its savior from the Communist insurgency and state-making of the tragedy in the form of monuments, literary works, and many others: “Threat is a felt quality, independent of any particular instance of itself... Threat is ultimately *ambient*. Its logic is purely *qualitative*... Threat’s ultimately ambient nature makes preemptive power an *environmental* power” (Massumi, “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 61-62).

“An operative logic is a productive process that inhabits a shared environment, or a field of exteriority, with other processes and logics” (Massumi 62). Such operative logic is what made Suharto’s plan work smoothly as though it was a domino effect: “An operative logic’s self-causative powers drive it automatically to extend itself; an operative logic is a will-to-power” (Massumi 63). Nevertheless, such a domino effect is equally fabricated and underlying it is actually just an ambitious man who has a great deal of will-to-power. The preemptive power incitation becomes a further productive basis once it materializes in the form of a semiosis (Massumi 63). Indeed, Suharto had executed his plans perfectly from the beginning up to the end of his collapsed regime due to his fabrications which were transformed into semiosis: “The performance takes place wholly between the sign and the “instinctively” activated body whose feeling is broken by the sign’s command to transition to a new feeling” (Massumi 64). Such a “new-feeling” in the context of this study is the feeling of the post-Reformation era feeling where Suharto’s lie had been unraveled and new studies regarding the *Gestapu* and

its semiosis have been conducted: “Understanding the political ontology of Threat requires returning thought to this affective twilight zone of indexical experience” (Massumi 66). The indexical experience can be seen through the construction of many forms of semiosis including monuments, movies, school curricula, and, in this study’s case, in literary forms. Indeed, literature can really become the bearer of truths in the context of unraveling particular historical fabrications.

“Star of Death” by Kipandjikusmin (1967)

The story revolves around Ktut Geria, a Communist, who reaches into the Madura Prau and steps away by leaving Java to go to the Island of Bali. He recalls the events that occurred in Jakarta on the northwest coast of Java which centers on the *Gestapu*. Ktut is lucky enough to flee Suharto’s assault as he is given instructions to initiate a counterattack in Bali. Massumi states that “Threat is affectively self-causing [...] any action taken to preempt a Threat from emerging into a clear and present danger is legitimated by the affective fact of fear, actual facts aside” (“The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 47.) Such a succinct definition particularly covers Massumi’s whole proposition in his *Political Ontology of Threat* theory. This imminent presence of Threat is ubiquitous in this work by Kipandjikusmin. In this work, Threat becomes a weapon of mass destruction by the State Apparatuses against Communists who are mostly civilians.

In “Star of Death,” the conflict becomes evident in such a context since the main character named Gde Naja is a PKI member himself who is running away from the anti-PKI mass and an old rival who is full of hatred. Gde Naja is also the protagonist’s old student whom he kicked out of school for being an anti-Sukarnoist. The names of the characters indicate that they are Balinese and the story is set in Bali. The choice of the writer in choosing Bali highlights the fact that the conflict also occurred where it is less likely known to happen—in a non-Muslim and non-Javanese territory. The firsthand depiction of the figure of the Communists here is seen in the character that is Gde Naja who bears a grudge against Ktut Geria for expelling him from school because he did not support Sukarno. Sukarno was a great supporter

of Marxism and Communism. He also wanted to embrace the Communists under his NASAKOM ideology.

The PKI, as noted by Anderson and McVey, did not have any motivation for staging a coup d'état because the Party "had been doing very well by the peaceful road" under President Sukarno. The depiction of the figure of the Communist here goes back to the times before the events of the *Gestapu*. The PKI was strong under Sukarno's wing and the depiction of this strength can be seen from the portrayal of Ktut's capability in kicking Naja out of school because he did not support Sukarno. The PKI was already "feared" by the people because of their power under Sukarno's leadership. Suharto's Threat propaganda strengthens this fear with incitements. Massumi's theory on affective fact of fear comes to play in the form of preemptive actions against the PKI elements. However, these preemptive actions were out of proportion and in this short story, these actions were portrayed in a number of parts.

When Ktut finally reaches Bali, he is surprised that the Balinese hate the PKI as much as the Javanese do over what happened in Jakarta. The consequential events that become the trigger of the whole plot is mentioned in this story including the depiction of "the attack of RPKAD [*Resimen Penggepur Kilat Angkatan Darat*], a command troop [now *Kopassus*] which was very dominant in destroying the movement several hours after the Lubang Buaya Event" (Taum 71). Mentioning the RPKAD is a reference to the suspiciously fast conduct of Suharto in countering the movement. John Roosa posits that this coup carried out by military officers was quickly countered by other elements in the Armed Forces under the direction of General Suharto (Zurbuchen 565). He also adds that "[t]he movement appeared so incoherent and ineffectual because it was a fake operation that was meant to be easily defeated" (Roosa 71):

So he was finally leaving Java. It had been his first visit and the island represented a collage of proud and horrifying dreams.

The student movement, CGMI, congress in Jakarta. The fierce rallies in Senayan stadium. The secret meetings and the military training at Lubang

Buaya. The climactic assault on the generals. When the RPKAD paracommando troops smashed the movement, he had been lucky enough to escape to central Java, walking most of the way, day after day. The caretaker leadership sent him instructions through a number of couriers to form bases in Bali for the counter-attack. It was a death sentence. The caretaker leadership sent him instructions through a number of couriers to form bases in Bali for the counterattack. The public attitude to Communism was extreme (Kipandjikusmin, "Star of Death" 27).

Such a case wherein people's feelings of hatred toward the PKI in Java is tantamount to those in Bali therefore making them congruent with the very description of affect: "In this ever-gathering accretion of force-relations (or, conversely, in the peeling or wearing away of such sedimentations) lie the real powers of affect, affect as potential: a body's capacity to affect and to be affected" (Gregg and Seigworth, *The Affect Theory Reader* 1). The affect or Threat, in this context, is capable of imbuing such massive conduct toward the bodies of the Javanese and the Balinese. Such bodily processes can be seen in the description that "the public attitude to Communism was extreme." This "attitude" is a part of the bodily sensation: "[a] feeling or opinion about something or someone, or a way of behaving that is caused by this" (*Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary*). Suharto's *Gestapu* is the cause of the feeling, opinion, behavior compounded in the "attitude." The fact that the attitudes of the Balinese are as extreme as the Javanese toward the Communists shows how powerful and potential affect is as stated by Massumi.

The bodies, namely those of the Javanese and the Balinese, possess the capacity of affecting and to be affected in return regardless of distance and regional differences. This disregarding of time and space is a product of the ambient nature of Threat which allows the promulgation of preemptive power into an environmental one. In other words, "Threat is a felt quality, independent of any particular instance of itself; Threat is ultimately ambient [...] its logic is purely qualitative [...] Threat's ultimately ambient nature makes preemptive power an environmental power" (Massumi, "The Future Birth of the Affective Fact" 62).

The allusion toward what triggered the hatred toward the Communists is also addressed in the short story: “The fierce rallies in Senayan stadium [...] the secret meetings and the military training at Lubang Buaya. [...] the climactic assault on the generals” (Kipandjikusmin, “Star of Death” 27). Threat in this context converts in high velocity into the feeling of hatred due to the preemptive measures of the people. The ambient feeling of being threatened for what happened in Jakarta may have happened in Bali, too, and it becomes a powerful source of motivation. Effectively, the prompt that “a body’s capacity to affect and to be affected” becomes factual in the depiction of the Balinese as being affected by the Communist Threat just as the Javanese were.

Aveling also delivers his proposition regarding the discussion on the writer’s choice of Bali as the story’s setting and the fact that it is a non-Muslim and non-Javanese territory. He mentions that the land campaign had also been strong in Bali where confrontation (between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party) was so tense that armed clashes had become a frequent occurrence (vi). The difference (compared to the events in Java) lies in the fact that the chief civilian participants in Hindu Bali were not members of religious affiliations but members of the Indonesian Nationalist Party or *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI) (vii). The story is unique since it tells the story of conflict between the Communists against a particular party without reference to any religious affiliations but at the same time, the plot is entangled with religious and mythical allegories. This is seen in the allusion to “the Death Star” which is a reference to the manifestation of the greedy Yama (the god of the death), Shiva the Supreme Hindu god of Destruction, and “Durga, a Hindu goddess whose task is combatting evil” (Phillips, Kerrigan, and Gould, *Ancient India’s Myths* 93-94):

He listened, suddenly anxious, startled by the song.

Thank you, Lady Durga, for your mercy
you have conquered the cruelty of Yama,
Bearer of hell-fire to heaven,
Whose tale spread death.

Those who saw him were appalled.
Yama ordered those in your palace,
Widows and orphans, to weep (Kipandjikusmin, “Star of Death” 29).

These mythically-themed allusions are directed to the events revolving around the *Gestapu* as well as its subsequent Communist purge. The *Gestapu* as well as the figure of the Communists and those alleged to be Communists were described as the manifestation of the greedy Yama, the god of death—hence the title “Star of Death”: “Anyone who sees the god of death would become angry, revengeful, and would desire to kill in their spirit” (Taum 74). The priests said that Yama, god of death, was angry: men had sinned. Many people saw the star before the PKI revolted (Kipandjikusmin, “Star of Death” 30).

Such is the perspective that this short story brings in terms of blaming the PKI for all the calamities occurring around the country particularly in Java and Bali. That a bad sign, namely, the “death star” occurs prior to the revolution of the PKI is a direct allusion to The New Order’s *Gestapu*. It is understandable that this short story does not contest the regime’s version of the *Gestapu* due to the fact that the oppositional role played by Kipandjikusmin is to criticize the mass murder of the victims rather than unraveling the New Order’s falsehood. However, “[d]espite the steady stream of propaganda for more than thirty years, Suharto’s army never proved that the PKI had masterminded the movement” (Roosa 65). This means that the post-reformation reading of the symbol offers a different interpretation regarding the “PKI’s revolt.” To put into context the semiotics of the post-Reformation interpretation on the “The Death Star,” the symbol can reach the discussion related to the role of the Army in the *Gestapu*.

The author’s statement that “many people saw the star before the PKI revolted” may be interpreted as the knowledge of the people about the Army’s involvement in the *Gestapu* even prior to the event. The undeniably significant role of the Army in the *Gestapu* is proposed by Roosa, Wertheim, Crouch, Anderson and McVey; the symbol of the star may be interrelated with the role of the Army. The “star” may become the author’s surreptitious

hint to invite the readers to question the actuality of the New Order's version of the *Gestapu*. The "star" is a symbol of the Army, particularly due to the fact that badges attached on the chests of military men are insignias with the shape of stars. These people include the post-Reformation researchers who dared to question the Army's version of the *Gestapu* even during the reign of Suharto (e.g., Anderson and McVey's "Cornell Papers" [1971], Crouch's "The Army and Politics in Indonesia" [1978] and Wertheim's work [1970]). They revealed the possibility that Suharto, using some military officers, may have been involved or even masterminded the *Gestapu*, that the PKI and the Army have equally important roles in the movement, or that the PKI was only a supporter of the movement while the Army was the head of it. In this context, the reference to Kipandjikusmin's statement that "many people saw the star before the PKI revolted" is a possible hint by the author to say that the Army (seen in the symbol of the star) precedes the PKI revolt. The author implies that the Army has equally strong roles in the *Gestapu* as proposed by the post-Reformation researchers. The contradiction lies in the fact that punishments toward the PKI elements both proven and alleged were real and present but no one ever questioned the role of the Army in the *Gestapu* during Suharto's time.

The impact of the ambient Threat as proposed by Massumi leads to the depiction of mass murder as shown in this passage:

It was a death sentence. The public attitude to Communism was extreme. A Communist was the lowest form of human filth, fit only for extermination. It was proclaimed throughout the land that those who did not believe in God should die (Kipandjikusmin, "Star of Death" 27).

Aside from the fact that this depicts the figure of the PKI as excrement fit only for extermination since they are of the lowest life form, this also confirms Massumi's theory that political conducts indeed are capable of usurping affect. Affect is proto-political by nature which means that although affect occurs even before politics, just a pinch of the political can greatly manipulate it. The politics of the New Order "brands" Communists as people deserving of death: "[Affect] concerns the first stirrings of the political, flush with

the felt intensities of life, its politics must be brought out” (*Politics of Affect* viii-ix.) Another fact is the portrayal of the Communists as those deserving death for their disbelief in God. This is a reference to the New Order’s decree regarding the two commemoration days of the Communist Coup and the Pancasila Sanctity: “September 30 was commemorated as the Treason Day of G30S/PKI and October 1 was the Pancasila Sanctity, it is in those days that Suharto self-cautiously proclaimed that justice and righteousness had to be defended; PKI being the mastermind of G30S was declared before God Himself” (Adam, *Dari Gestok* 92).

The New Order used the *Pancasila*, the core principle of the country, for Suharto’s political campaign of Threat since its first point imposes the belief in the one and only God (*Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa*).⁴ In addition, the third point which deals with Democracy (*Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan dan perwakilan*) also may be used against the Communists. The Communists are easy targets for such a campaign since Indonesians even up to this day still perceive Communists as atheists and opportunists wanting to replace Indonesian democracy with Communism. Because they are seen as greatly going against the *Pancasila*, they were perceived by people as those who were most likely to conduct a coup against the monotheistic and democratic foundations of the country. Such a conduct, according to Massumi, is called an “operative logic”: “An operative logic’s self-causative powers drive it automatically to extend itself; an operative logic is a will-to-power” (Massumi, “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 63). The New Order’s will-to-power does not only make of the Communists victims but also people who become tools to reach the regime’s own ends:

Perhaps it’s the old story, my son. The holy war of Puputan, sixty years ago, was preceded by the sighting of a comet. So was the Great War at Klungkung. The priests said that Yama, god of death, was angry: men had sinned. Many people saw the star before the PKI revolted. Those who saw it tasted death. They felt threatened: they had to kill before others killed them (Kipandjikusmin, “Star of Death” 30).

This part mentions two wars. The holy war of *Puputan*, a Balinese term for a mass ritual suicide as a symbol of preference for death over the humiliation of defeat, are notable rituals in the history of Bali which occurred when the Balinese were being subjugated by the Dutch (Robert Pringle, *A Short History of Bali* 106). The other is the *Klungkung* war which happened in a small province of Bali namely Klungkung. That the two wars were juxtaposed with the PKI coup which were initiated by the sightings of the comet that symbolizes bad omen shows that the movement was perceived as something as equally devastating as the aforementioned tragedies. The sense of the people that they “had to kill before others killed them” is ultimately congruent with Massumi’s proposition: “The preemptive actions taken in response to the Threat are still logically and politically correct if they are commensurate with the urgency of Threat; the measure of an alert’s correctness is the immediacy and specificity of the preemptive actions it automatically triggers” (“The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 67). The New Order’s imposing of the Communist Threat in the short story is so rampant that it consequently affects the people in Bali who only heard of the *Gestapu* without knowing the actual facts of the movement.

In fact, Robinson states that in December 1965, a full two months after the alleged coup attempt, the violence finally started in Bali where an estimated eighty thousand people were killed in a matter of months (8). Moreover, in reference to Massumi’s theory that the preemptive action is commensurate with the Threat, it must be mentioned that in Indonesia’s case, the number of victims of the Communist purge shows that the attacks against the PKI were not commensurate and “blown out of proportions.” The regime propagandized the fact that there were six military-men murdered in the *Gestapu*. They generated a “mind-game” and imbued information that PKI was capable of killing high-ranking military-men. The subsequent result following such a “mind-game” is the alarm that triggered people into believing that no one is safe from the PKI’s killing spree. The final result is the death of eighty thousand people in Bali alone; on a national scale, the number of victims reached millions in number. Clearly, the Army and General Suharto used the movement as pretext to legitimize their scheme

in toppling Sukarno who supported the PKI: “An alarm may determine the generic identity of a potential Threat, without specifically determining the actual identity of the objects involved [...] the affective reality of Threat is contagious” (Massumi 67). The Balinese did not specifically know what in Java had happened which incited hatred toward the Communist but such is the nature of Threat; it is contagious:

It was awful, my son. They killed women too. It was said that the *Gerwani* had been involved in Lubang Buaya: The people showed them no mercy. I found some of their bodies on the side of the river south of Kuta. Their guts hung out; their backs were full of knife wounds, carvings of open-mouthed crocodiles.” Wayan shook his head and dragged on his palm-leaf cigarette (Kipandjikusmin qtd. in Aveling, *GESTAPU* 30).

Another direct allusion to the *Gestapu* is the reference to the *Gerwani* who were believed by the people to be involved in the killings of the six Army-men in a very sadistic manner—killings, i.e., according to Suharto’s version. Mention of the event in this part is declared by Wayan, an old oxen-cart driver in whose station Ktut happens to stop by. Suharto’s version had spread rumors and even created monuments in order to portray female members of the Communist Party (called *Gerwani*) as abhorrently taking part in the Lubang Buaya tragedy. This is a definitive example of the dangers of Threat by way of hearsays and gossips immortalized in the form of monuments. The contagiousness of Threat by way of hearsays becomes even more excessive due to the construction of the monuments. The Sacred *Pancasila* Monument is the main monument out of many others in the country that supports the rumors invented by the regime and enshrines the rumors that the *Gerwani* danced *Harum Bunga* (fragrant flower) naked while the generals were murdered.

John Roosa counters such a false narrative as he states that it was an absurd fabrication by psychological warfare experts (Roosa 40). The rumors were effective in motivating the killings of the allegedly Communist Balinese women who were not involved in the *Gestapu* since the killings happened in Jakarta on the island of Java, more than a thousand kilometers away from the

island where Bali is located. This is in accordance with Masumi's proposition that "Threat is affectively self-causing [...] any action taken to preempt a Threat from emerging into a clear and present danger is legitimated by the affective fact of fear, actual facts aside" ("The Future Birth of the Affective Fact" 54). Suharto's version, although historically inaccurate, was very successful in achieving its atrocious agenda through State propaganda.

Toward the end of the story, Ktut stays in a peaceful village in northern Bali. Ktut, while waiting for the arrival of Wayan's nephew, stumbles upon Gde Naya. Naya is threatening him about the killings of the Communists and about Ktut being brought to the regional military command (*Kodim*) to be "processed." Ktut ends Naya's life with an unexpected throw of a knife, panics, and runs away hastily while wounding anyone who was standing in his way. As he is running erratically, he dies of madness:

Madness overcame him. The earth began to give way with a loud roar. Many blinded animals had been driven there before, now it was the turn of a man: Ktut Geria. The men stopped as soon as they heard the rumble and his scream. They stood there stunned, not knowing what to do until the snapping of soil and stone died away. The dust rose in the gray light. Suddenly one man whispered to another. The whispers formed a chain. They were terrified. None wanted to be the last to leave. All swore to tell their wives to bring a plate of food to the village temple to ask forgiveness for their having set foot on the holy ground of Shiva, the supreme destroyer (Kipandjikusmin, "Star of Death" 36).

Ktut's death in the holy grounds, a sacred place which is used to present gifts of sacrifice, reveals the author's intention not to let Ktut Geria die as a result of committing manslaughter but, instead, as an "offering to the heavens." This short story plays the role of opposition against the New Order's Communist purge propaganda by representing the PKI through the figure that is Ktut Geria as neither an enemy nor a traitor. They are just the scapegoats, the victims of offerings to Shiva—the Supreme Hindu god of Destruction. The story also represents the anti-PKI masses as actually the guilty ones who must expiate their faults by presenting offerings in the village temples.

Such a daring conduct by Kipandjikusmin in playing the role of opposition is remarkable. Despite the fact that the writer does not defy the New Order's narrative of the *Gestapu*, he gives symbolic hints that invite the readers to question the veracity of the New Order propaganda. In order for him to deliver his idea that the New Order's narrations were incorrect, the writer delivers certain metaphors that invite the readers to rethink the New Order's version: "The legitimation of preemptive action may falter because of the lack of actual facts" (Roosa 56). Actual facts regarding the *Gestapu* started to be uncovered long after Kipandjikusmin wrote the story. This happened only after the fall of the regime more than thirty years later. However, the fact that there are writers who played the role of opposition during the regime's reign, despite dire consequences for them, shows how there really were Indonesians who sought the truth to promote humanitarian acts, albeit the gruesomeness of the Communist purge.

"Cain's Lamb" by Kipandjikusmin (1968)

Similar to "Star of Death," Kipandjikusmin's "Cain's Lamb" offers the view of the Communist Threat from the perspective of the victim, namely Karno. The title is a religious allegory referring to the biblical Cain and his lamb offering. The short story's plot also has similarities to the biblical story. The main character is a soldier sent by the Indonesian government to help Sarawak's People's Liberation Army, a Communist insurgency movement, to attack the Malaysian government. Karno becomes a subject of turmoil due to the RSA after his family is killed since they are part of the PKI. The killings still occur even if Karno went compliantly to war as assigned by the government. The demise of Karno, similar to that of Ktut Geria, is not caused by the antagonists of the story namely the State apparatuses and the anti-PKI masses. The writer does not want these two characters to be brutally murdered by the masses (Roosa 95). Instead, the author portrays the demise of both of the characters by way of psychological devastations; in the case of "Cain's Lamb," the main character commits suicide. Saddening though it may be, the main character is at least spared from what the rampaging masses could do to him: "Karna shot himself through the head and died. Petrus the

regent, on the other hand, was not seriously wounded and had time to think while he was in the hospital” (Kipandjikusmin qtd. in Aveling, *GESTAPU* 1). According to Yoseph Yapi Taum, “[t]he psychological outburst he had to face all the time was a strong reason for Karno to fall into madness” (106). Such madness then materializes into an act of suicide:

The tears stuck in his throat and turned into the scream of a lunatic. He ran outside and they heard shots. Only when Piet fell to the floor under the chair did they realize what had happened (Kipandjikusmin, “Cain’s Lamb” 11).

However, unlike the former short story where the main character becomes the primary victim of the Threat incited by the New Order, in this short story the victims also include the protagonist’s family members who were mercilessly massacred. Their house was also burned down by the village people and the Army. The story of Karno is congruent to Massumi’s lens as he proposed: “An alarm may determine the generic identity of a potential Threat, without specifically determining the actual identity of the objects involved [...] the affective reality of Threat is contagious” (“The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 67):

They stood. The room filled with the stink of alcohol and the presence of death. “Where’s the Commander?” Karno snapped. His aggressive attitude silenced Bustomi. Staring fiercely at Suyatman Kamo shouted: “Is it you? Did you let those bastards kill my family?” [...] “I was glad to be back. I had suffered. I’d known what it was to be disappointed. I thought I’d find peace. The town has beaten me. I wanted to find my family.” His grief stuck in his throat. “They would have been glad to know I was alive, even if I do look like this.” Suddenly he began to cry hysterically. The world seemed barren. The words began to pour out. “Instead I found a hell. The whole family dead. The house reduced to rubble. Why did you do it? All right. So my father had a position in the Communist Party. Only this town could kill a whole family and burn its house down as well and the rest of you just stood by and watched.” Piet raised his head in sympathy (Kipandjikusmin, “Cain’s Lamb” 8, 10).

The alarm that determines the generic identity of a potential Threat in Karno's case is his father's position in the PKI and such a fact is used as a legitimation to destroy all of the elements related to Karno's father. Such a conduct is inevitably a result of the contagious nature of Threat. Threat based on what happened in the *Gestapu* as propagated by the New Order regime—blaming the PKI—becomes contagious and usurps the minds of the people. Such fear materializes into actions which push people to conduct massive brutal murders of anyone associated with the PKI including those who are not even members of the PKI. The contagion is the situation where only the father is implicated with the PKI. However, people being affected by Threat are compelled to think that the whole family is also “infected” by the father. This is the basis for killing Karno's whole family. Such is Karno's upsetting experience regarding his family. In addition, a ubiquitous show of sadism appears due to the fact that even a soldier who is part of the State apparatus is not spared. In fact, even a member of the Army, an instrument of the State's RSA cannot escape from the atrocity that is the indiscriminate murder of a family member who is discovered to be a PKI member. Such conduct can only be done through a great deal of Threat abuse which is what the New Order does. This is the reason why the story's title is an allegorical reference to the biblical Cain of the Old Testament:

There is a story in the Old Testament. Cain, Adam's evil son, sacrificed a lamb. He slaughtered it, divided and burned it. For nothing. God hated Cain's evil and would have nothing to do with his offering. We, the children of Cain, do as our ancestors did. Karna was no better than Cain's lamb. Human hands had robbed him of his simplicity, his beliefs, his reasons for living and his future (Kipandjikusmin, “Cain's Lamb” 1).

Cain's sacrifice is tantamount to Karno's. Karno delves into the fires for the offering that is the war in Malaysia where he faces calamities, injuries, and other sacrifices only to find that it is all for nothing. He ponders such a reality during a conversation with his spiritual director, Daeng Sambara:

“I can't understand why God wants it this way. My face is ruined. I'm impotent. I can't think. I'll probably die soon. All for nothing” Karno spat

on the sand. “It wasn’t wasted. God opened our eyes.” “What do you mean?” He wanted to stop us bowing down to stupidity. Confrontation was stupid. The nation is poor. We’re in debt. The masses are starving. Every bullet we fired came from America or Russia. Is that how we prepare to win a war?” The old man stopped and gazed into the distance. “The generals promised bombs. The only weapons they had were empty words” (Kipandjikusmin, “Cain’s Lamb” 4).

The juxtaposition of Cain’s lamb to Karno’s life is somehow equal since, despite the fact that the biblical Cain is portrayed as a figure of evil, his sacrifice is still a precious and pure offering presented to God. Karno’s life is Cain’s lamb sacrifice and not Cain the biblical character. Karno daringly presents himself as a sacrifice and he gives all that he has only to find that it is all of no value; his family is killed anyway and his house burned down. He expects to be proclaimed a hero once he returns from Malaysia but reality apparently turns out differently—he is only a mere sacrifice:

So, as far as his family and friends were concerned, he was a hero. If they knew he was still alive that admiration would change to pity, or even to mockery. He was a living memory of the sacrifices demanded by Confrontation. A victim of stupidity and idle chatter, as Daeng had said (Kipandjikusmin, “Cain’s Lamb” 7).

“Threat alerts are quick to form their own iterative series, which proliferate robustly because of the suppleness and compellingness of the affective logic generating them” (Massumi, “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 60). The Communist Threat quickly forms an iterative series. It shifts in rapid progression from one thing into many other things—from an expected hero of a nation sent to war abroad into a man with nothing at his disposal. This is all caused by the “suppleness and compellingness” of the imminent Communist Threat imposed by the New Order which is capable of changing a man’s life completely as seen in the short story.

“Cain’s Lamb” by Kipandjikusmin is the only short story in the period of 1966-1970 which delivers hard protests by way of asking for accountability from the military and civil authorities. Karno even threatened the regional

military command (*kodim*) commander and shot the regent and the soldiers who had nothing to do with the genocide when his family was murdered (Taum 103):

“Regent, you were a good neighbor of ours.” His anxiety rose again. “I didn’t think you’d be on the same side as these bastards. You’re no better than the rest of them. Did you hear them scream as they died? Did it sound pleasant?” Piet shook his head. “I was out of town. I couldn’t do a thing to stop it. The revolution goes on. It demands sacrifice.” “It’s a cat-shit revolution. Only a fool could talk about revolution when things are this bad,” Kamo shouted. Piet realised he had said the wrong thing. [...] Karno was overcome with remorse. He had killed so many: thirty soldiers on their way back from the mosque, the civil guardsman at the gate. And now Piet the regent, the man he had admired for so many years. He wondered what they had done wrong (Kipandjikusmin, “Cain’s Lamb” 9, 10).

The fact that Piet has good relations with Karno and his family members does not make the regent conscious enough to prevent the killing of Karno’s family. In fact, Piet extenuates his wrongdoing in being silent by saying that “[revolution] demands sacrifices.” Karno and his family are the depiction of sacrifices and the “revolution” is an allusion to the New Order’s so-called revolution against the conducts of the Communist. Such a depiction that is the figure of Piet is highly congruent with Massumi’s proposition which says, “[t]he performance takes place wholly between the sign and the ‘instinctively’ activated body whose feeling is broken by the sign’s command to transition to a new feeling” (“The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 64). The “sign” stands for the stories of the Communists as imposed by the regime. “The ‘instinctively’ activated body” is seen through Piet’s change from being a good neighbor of Karno and his family members into an indifferent and ignorant person amidst the atrocities committed against his neighbors. This part shows that Piet’s body is activated and this results in his past feeling (friendliness toward Karno’s family) to break. Piet is infected by Suharto’s sign (the *Gestapu*) which commands his transition to a new feeling: a feeling of being threatened by the Communists. This, therefore, causes him to rationalize that Karno’s family deserve the atrocities since they are a threat to

society. Although Piet does not contribute to the killings, he is as guilty as the perpetrators since he rationalizes and therefore extenuates his state of being indifferent by saying that all of the killings are just part of a demand that is the New Order's so-called "revolution."

"War and Humanity" by Usamah (1969)

"War and Humanity" is a story about a man called Usamah who is assigned as an executioner of the members, sympathizers, and basically anyone associated with the PKI. The story begins with a brief history of the reason why the government assigns the people to eradicate the Communists. It is based on the fact that the PKI previously conducted a coup attempt which results in the killing of the seven generals part of the Council of Generals who were suspected of planning a coup against Sukarno:

Two days after the Revolutionary Council was announced, the Communist Youth Corps, Pemuda Rakyat, left their bases in Semanggi, Kampung Sewu and Mejo, and jostled through the streets of Pasar Kliwon, Gading, down to Purwosari. They acted like braves who had just won the war. From time to time they shouted: "Down with the Council of Generals!" Although most of them were still boys, they carried Chinese guns marked "Chung" (peace) and this gave them an arrogant expression. Protected by their weapons, they launched a paper offensive [...] it soon became clear that the Communists had taken a leading role in the murder of the generals (Usamah qtd. in Aveling, Usamah, "War and Humanity" 12).

This marks the author's compliance with Suharto's version of the *Gestapu* whereas the Communists become the sole killers of the generals. This is another proof that the oppositional authors of 1966-1970 indeed did not intend to scrutinize Suharto's *Gestapu*. Their only aim was to promote justice toward the Communists and Communist sympathizers who were victims of indiscriminate murders and imprisonment without trial conducted by the regime. All of these were done, as mentioned in the previous part in Kipandjikusmin's "Star of Death," despite the fact that the regime cannot prove that the PKI is the sole perpetrator the September 30 coup.

This short story has similarities to “Cain’s Lamb” since it depicts the protagonist as part of the State apparatus: Usamah plays the role of an executioner of the Communists and his dilemma reaches its peak when he has to interrogate and torture people whom he knows and even admires. Usamah’s circumstances are congruent with Massumi’s theory: “Self-renewing menace potential is the future reality of Threat. Threat is not real in spite of its nonexistence. It is superlatively real, because of it” (“The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 53). Usamah’s circumstance is a result of the evoking of Threat by the regime to instigate a desired condition or/and situation to the public.

In the beginning, Usamah is poised to destroy the Communists which compels him to join the anti-Communist front. This is the result of the successful propaganda of the Communist Threat conducted by the regime:

I began to suspect everyone I met and decided to move from my aunt’s house to the campus of Saraswati University. I was set on taking an active part in crushing the Communist Party. I set up a network in the *kampung* where the Communist Party was strong [...] Several members of the Anti-Communist Front brought useful information, which was very important when the Army Para-Commandos began looking for evidence to arrest people. We had the most complete intelligence service around (Usamah 13).⁵

The conflict arises as he is faced with the reality that he has to interrogate and eventually torture people whom he knows, some of whom are even very close to him:

I knew some of the prisoners and had twice to interrogate my friends. My own friends [...] Mrs. Y taught civics in a Solo High School. We had often met at a friend’s house, and had even met a few days before the Coup. We were interested in the same sort of things, and found it easy to talk. She was a member of a Communist-dominated Teachers’ Union [...] my experience with Dr. X was different. He was my aunt’s family doctor and had attended my aunt, my cousins and even myself. I still had to go back to his hospital for more injections. He greeted me by reminding me of this. He was the friendliest doctor I had ever known [...] Sri was my classmate. She was a member of the Communist student movement, CGMI, although I did not

know this because there were no extracurricular activities at school. I didn't have much to do with her anyway (Usamah 13-15, 18.).

Usamah has no choice but to proceed and command the murder of his family doctor whom he admires, Mrs. Y whom he had often met and discussed many things with, and Sri, his former classmate. The pain makes him ask for a different position in the team rather than his position as an Executioner. The corporeality of Threat as depicted in the short story goes further to the extent where it depicts a scene where Communists are tortured and murdered without undergoing interrogation. These Communists happen to be Mrs. Y and Sri:

For five hours I tried to draw up a report showing why what had happened was necessary. I couldn't. I couldn't put the blame on Mrs. Y and Sri, nor could I objectively report that Sri had been imprisoned and executed without even being interrogated first (Usamah 21).

This depicts the harsh reality of a defensive preemptive action due to the imposing Threat of an unreal danger which is the PKI coup. Related to this, Massumi states: a Threat that does not materialize is not false; it has all the affective reality of a past future, truly felt on the domestic front, the defensive preemptive actions set in motion in response to the Threat are of the same kind and bring on many of the same effects as would have accompanied an actual danger ("The Future Birth of the Affective Fact" 54, 57).

The short story depicts a scene where Usamah rationalizes the situation as a war to prevent a far greater danger that is the Communist uprising, helping him to assuage himself from the guilt of punishing his own friend: "It is war, and had the PKI won, what happened to Sri might have happened to me" (Usamah 21).

An "actual Threat" as proposed by Massumi should have a "could have" and "would have" binary stating that "[i]f the Threat does not materialize, it still always would have if it could have. If the Threat does materialize, then it just goes to show that the future potential for what happened had really been there in the past" ("The Future Birth of the Affective Fact" 56).

The Suharto regime plays a “mind-game” toward the people using a logical pattern: the Communists had a plan to incite insurgence, had the capacity to incite insurgence—they did not have the capacity, but they still would have if they could have. Such logic is utilized to generate such a pretext which is literally undisputed by the people and by the main character of the short story in particular.

Utilizing such logic, the New Order imposes a conditioning which leads to the torture and killing of the Communists, and the main character who is commanded to perform the actions become a subject of the Threat as well. Usamah is a victim in the sense that he is forced to do things out of his own consent and conscience. It is depicted in story that the main character experiences an extremely painful stream of guilt for having to call out the person, whom he knows and even admires, to be tortured and killed:

“I was only a sentry doing his duty...I wanted to shout out and tell her that I wanted to call Kijem, the prostitute, and *Gerwani*, instead of her. But the soldiers were watching me. I was scared. Perhaps they would think I was in cahoots with her...I didn't dare. I couldn't bear picking out my friends so they could be executed” (Usamah 21).

This scene is in line with Massumi's notion that “the preemptive actions taken in response to the Threat are still logically and politically correct if they are commensurate with the urgency of Threat” (“The Future Birth of the Affective Fact” 59). The Threat in this scene functions by targeting Sri who is a member of the Communist Party; the pretext that is used to legitimize her torture and killing shows that these actions are commensurate with the urgency of the Threat as propagandized by the regime. The fact that Usamah rationalizes his position as being just a mere worker doing his duty is actually an actual form of expiating for his outburst of guilt and confusion. He is also filled with the fear that if he were to relieve Sri of her pain, he will be branded as a Communist sympathizer himself (i.e., in “cahoots” with her). Such rampant outburst and self-pressure lead him to self-destruction:

Bitter experiences such as these forced me to ask for a different position in the team. My request was granted. I was moved to the back of the prison administration section at the back of the offices... although I had to suffer silently in another way and, to exaggerate, leave my conscience to self-destruct as best it could (Usamah 17).

In this portrayal, the main character who is assigned to capture the Communists becomes, indeed, a victim of “the preemptive action” as well. He shows complete reluctance to undergo the task because he cannot stand the sight of torture toward his friends. Meanwhile, the environmental power of the Threat compels other soldiers and sentries to be poised to finish off the Communists. This theory is in accordance with the scene in the story where the main character wants to run away from the situation.

Usamah feels that he cannot take the situation any longer especially since he is forced to see someone he personally knows being tortured and killed. Purportedly, this has a connection to the choice of the author in naming the main character as Usamah. His name is the same as the author’s which symbolically alludes to the writer’s own life choice. Usamah was a member of the two organizations namely KAMI and KAPPI which were strong oppositions against the Communists. “The guilt” as seen through the executioner’s is supposedly his motivation that propels him to change the roles of the two organizations from opposing the Communists to defending or at least sympathizing with them:

On the night bus I felt that I was leaving all my cares far behind me. I didn’t give a damn what anyone might think or do. I was bored and I couldn’t lie to myself any longer... Was I running away? Yes, I was. They would talk about me and say that I was a coward, although they had no right to do so. I didn’t care, I had to rest... I hadn’t wanted her to die mistrusting and hating me, as she probably did. Her death depressed me. I swear to God I couldn’t have watched it (Usamah 21-22).

The part which is the end of the story highlights even further that the main character is also a victim of the propaganda. He becomes the victim of guilt, pressure, and indecisive feelings for being forced to do something against his

own conscience and free will. The Threat in this scene materializes itself in the form of mockery, ridicule, or even accusations which would be pinned down to him if he were to be caught running away from his duty. Such a scene is another congruent example of Massumi's theory on operative logic as he states that it is filled with the will-to-power capable of extending itself ("The Future Birth of the Affective Fact" 63). This part presents a portrayal of a man having to experience an inner torture since he has no choice but to allow something against his own conscience to happen. The Communist Threat and the New Order have a form of will-to-power far beyond Usamah's own capacity.

He cannot prevent his friend, Sri, from being killed and he cannot do anything but let power take control of the situation going on around him. Considering such facts and analysis, the short story indeed performs itself well as a portrayal of how power and Threat becomes such a destructive device against humanity. This short story highly portrays a new perspective of the Communists amidst the ever-imminent propaganda incited by the regime—that they are as human as anyone else. They share the same humanity as their executioners:

However, they were human beings that were once born with many difficulties and to live and to struggle with many difficulties too. I did not see their cruelties. I only knew that they were human beings. The best of God's creatures! (Taum 286).

This is the so-called humanitarian opposition by way of culture conducted by these daring writers. Usamah is among them. Usamah in this short story and Usamah the author both are highly influenced by guilt. In the author's case, it becomes the means to deliver opposition against the regime by way of the short story.

"Dark Night" by Martin Aleida (1970)

Martin Aleida's "Dark Night" depicts victims of the New Order's state-making who are women and children as well as Communist family members. This comes from the perspective of the main character who is a neutral

figure and who happens to be the lover of the daughter of a Communist. The main character is named Kamaluddin Armada, a middle-lower class sailor and a small gas station vendor. Armada is a non-PKI character who does not engage himself in the Party nor the Communist purge. His bitter story lies in the fact that his fiancée, Partini, is killed before he is able to reach her hometown in Soroyudan, Central Java after traveling from Jakarta, West Java.

On board the ship, Armada meets a man who delightfully engages Armada in a conversation. There, the two exchange information about who they are—the man is the secretary of the administrative unit of Laban where Partini and her family live. The conversation begins to become intense as the man asks Armada who his fiancée is. The answer shocks the man because it turns out that Armada's fiancée is the daughter of Mulyoharjo, a big man in the PKI and someone who defended the peasant front in court in Solo during a land confiscation case. Mulyoharjo is seized after the purge and the people brutally murder him and throw his body in the river. Armada becomes surprised to hear of this and visions of Partini and his past with her comes back to him: Partini is the only person who ever loved him. Armada declares to the man that he already knew from Partini's letters that his future father-in-law is a Communist and that he has passed away. However, he does not know that the father was killed in a cruel and heartless manner. The man further informs him about being careful and bracing himself against anything that can contradict his expectations.

Armada thought that the man meant that the village where he is heading will reject him, its people thinking he is a Communist courier. The man said that Laban is a PKI stronghold and that one day, Partini's uncle, a Communist refugee, came to visit. The man continued to tell the story of how the people caught her uncle and shredded him to pieces. Following this horrific killing, the people also burned down the family house along with the people inside it, including Partini. The fact that Mulyoharjo's wife could not read and the other children knew nothing of politics does not spare them from being targeted by the people who did not discriminate at a time like that. All the bodies were thrown into the river. Reaching the burned house, Armada cannot conceive of what has happened to his life as he

becomes mentally unstable. The climax of his disruption when he traveled from Jakarta to Laban lies in the fact that he had expectations of marrying Partini, only to find out that she was already dead. His expectation to have a future with Partini remains an illusion and at the end of the story, Armada commits suicide.

Massumi's proposition is in line with the bitter story of Armada as a victim of Threat:

Classical Doctrine: This allows preemptive action in cases where there is a "clear and present danger" of attack. DEFENSE in the face of ACTUAL DANGER [...] Neoconservative Doctrine: This justifies offensive action against threats that are not fully emergent, or, more radically, that have not even begun to emerge [...] OFFENSE without ACTUAL DANGER ("The Future Birth of the Affective Fact" 56).

What happens to the victims, namely Partini and her family, is a product of a "Neoconservative Doctrine" in which indiscriminate offensive action against the PKI members and also their family are justified. Despite the fact that there are those in the family who do not know politics nor cannot even read, they are not spared from the atrocity. The hatred toward the PKI members in Indonesia's gruesome history is depicted proportionally in this short story which exemplifies Massumi's idea that "the Threat is not fully emergent, or, more radically, that have not even begun to emerge." The Communist Threat is not fully emergent due to the fact that, although PKI members were in the *Gestapu*, they have feeble roles during that night compared to those of the Army. Such similarity can be seen in Mulyoharjo and Partini's uncle's cases in the story where, although they were true PKI members, there was no information whether or not they were involved in the Lubang Buaya tragedy. But even if they were, such unlawful killings conducted by the anti-PKI masses cannot be justified. The Army was much more guilty about what happened that night yet no one ever blamed the Army much less Suharto.

The blatant depiction that confirms Massumi's proposition regarding the justification of offensive actions against "[t]hreats that have not even

begun to emerge” can be seen in the murder of Partini, her mother, as well as the other children. The averting against “threats that have not begun to emerge” by way of sadistic means cannot be justified:

They finished [Mulyoharjo] off in Bachan and threw him in the river like a dead fowl [...] they have borne their anger and bitterness a long time. When it finally explodes, one cannot expect them to be rational. We can both understand that. When anger and bitterness are king, intellect goes under. They were all killed. Partini, her mother, the other children, were hiding their uncle; he was a Communist. The families of Communists in other areas have disappeared as well, you know. The fact that Mrs. Mulyo couldn't read and that her children knew nothing about politics made no difference. Politics is blind. They all went into the river (Aleida qtd. in Aveling, *GESTAPU* 87-92).

The killings of the family members no matter how unaffiliated they are with the PKI or even with Communism come from true historical accounts in Indonesia under The New Order:

They were not, by any stretch, people with direct knowledge of or involvement in the events of October 1. On the contrary, they were targeted because they, or a family member or close friend, had joined the PKI or one of its many affiliated organizations, all of which were both legal and popular at the time (Robinson 122).

The last but not least portrayal of the victims of the Communist Threat by the regime in Martin Aleida's short story is the protagonist himself, Kamaluddin Armada. Realizing the reality that rips his dreams of marrying his fiancé after having to travel from his hometown, Armada surrenders to the abyss:

His eyes darkened and spun. The bridge shook. He leant against the rail, his strength draining from his body through the three wounds. “I'm coming, Partini,” he managed to moan. Blood washed over his shirt and body, and over the broken asphalt of the bridge. It dripped into the flowing water down below. At last his strength was gone. He was no longer Kamaluddin

Armada. He was a dead body. The body bent between the belly and the thighs, curled over the rail, and fell into the river (Aleida 95-96).

Armada decides to follow his beloved Partini who has preceded him in death. With this decision, the author seems to be inviting the readers to sympathize greatly with the Communists as well as with those who were murdered only because they were family members of the Communists. The readers are invited to ponder Armada's demise in choosing death over deep sorrow over not only losing a fiancée, but also over the harsh and unjust reality in the country. In particular, harshness and injustice against those of the lower-middle class are seen in the life of Kamalludin Armada. Readers seem to be encouraged to see the reality of the New Order's abysmal deeds in sacrificing those whom they proclaim as the cause of the country's disruption while hiding the fact that the regime itself is the cause. These atrocities occur only for the sole purpose of preserving the image of Suharto as the savior amidst "the Communist disruption."

Conclusion

Having looked into four literary representations of works written in the period 1966-1970, there are two significant points which can be drawn. First, regarding the historical discourses surrounding the stories, we can see that some short stories offer hints which invite the readers to question the New Order version of the *Gestapu*. In addition, although some short stories are frankly compliant with the New Order's version of the movement, the study persists in introducing the post-Reformation version of the events to reach the objective of highlighting the former version as the main propaganda or the main tool for Suharto's politics of Threat. This was also done in order to scrutinize what Massumi calls the *Politics of Threat* that led to the Communist purge. The textual evidence from the short stories provides an opening for the study to highlight the post-Reformation era versions of the event.

Second, related to the contextualization of the literary works of 1966-1970 in the role of opposition toward the regime, their authors' choice

distinctively focuses on fighting for the rights of the Communist elements, especially the innocent ones. Massumi's notion of Threat becomes ultimately crucial due to the fact that it is the ambient and contagious Threat which constructs the foundation of the whole plot centered on the killings, torture, and exile of the said innocent people: "The supposed preemptive logic incited via Threat creates an equally destructive consequence which it was actually trying to prevent" (59). Such equally destructive consequence, in the context of the Communist purge, becomes the most salient highlight which the literary productions portray.

Notes

1. CGMI stands for *Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa* (Unified Movement of Students of Indonesia). This was an organization of university students in Indonesia, which was founded in 1956 and linked to the PKI (Hindley 196-197).
2. The Historical Background of the “*Gestapu*,” and its Discourses. The prevalence of Suharto’s teachings regarding the Communists, the PKI, and Communism is related and cannot be separated from the discourse of Suharto’s ideology contestation during 1971-1980. This was the period of total hegemony under the New Order when major surveillance and intervention in many human aspects of the society took place. The state of the regime in 1970-1980 was different from its previous period, which is 1966-1970.
3. Lubang Buaya, Jakarta is where the six senior generals and lieutenant were kidnapped and murdered on the night of September 30, 1965.
4. The five principles of the Indonesian state.
5. “Kampung” means village.

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