Politics of Immigration Control and Detention in Post-war Japan
The Mobility Experiences of Koreans

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Abstract
This paper examines the institutionalization of the post-war Japanese border control system through an analysis of the international origins of the Ōmura Detention Camp (hereafter “the Ōmura Camp”), which was established in Japan under the Allied Occupation. In its origin, the Ōmura Camp was aimed not for confining people who committed illegal entry but just for offering a temporal waiting station for newly arrived immigrants. Nevertheless, the function of the Ōmura Camp began to deviate from its expected purpose and gradually started to play its unexpected role as a long term detention house exclusively for the detainee from the Korean peninsula or Korean residents in Japan, in accordance with the strained international situation around Japan. By focusing on the functional transition of the Ōmura Camp from a “normal” immigration control center to the detention camp which aimed to intern a specific national group, this paper reveals the political oscillation of the Japanese migration control system and evaluate its international origins in the post WWII and the early Cold War period.

Keywords
the Ōmura Detention Camp, Japanese immigration control during the Korean War, Korean residents in Japan (Zainichi Koreans), refugeeism in Japan
April, 1969 A demonstrator with a board "Japan's prison, StopOmura Camp"
(Photo: Nakatani Yoshitaka/Ryozan)

April, 1969 Beheiren's members walking around the wall of the Omura camp
(Photo: Nakatani Yoshitaka/Ryozan)
April, 1969 Oda Makoto put a bullhorn to his mouth
(Photo: Nakatani Yoshitaka/Ryozan)

April, 1969 Talk through a wall
(Photo: Nakatani Yoshitaka/Ryozan)
Though plenty of studies have treated on the post-war Japan’s immigration control administration, the slightest attention has paid on the history of the Ōmura Camp, one of the largest detention centers in Japan. Small numbers of detainee’s reminiscences have published which told us the author’s own experiences in the detention house. Among many immigration studies on Japan, there are few which intended to bridge both the institutional aspects which concerned with the socio-political, legal system and the individual aspects which concerned with one’s own private reality: there is a gap between the institutional and the individual, when we treat the matter of immigrants in Japan.

From this perspective, Ōnuma Yasuaki focused on the difficulties with which Korean residents in Japan encountered as a symptomatic case for evaluating the character of Japan’s immigration control system. Nevertheless, Ōnuma concentrated his arguments in confuting the myth of homogeneous nature of Japanese society as well as in asserting the civil rights of Korean residents in Japan. Yet, in his study the actuality of Japan’s immigration control system, which was shown towards Korean detainees in the detention camps, was overlooked. The Ōmura Camp always became a hard-fought field of political struggles. For example, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Ōmura Camp gradually became a site of proxy war: bloody factional conflicts between “North Korean” detainees and “South Korean” detainees occurred repeatedly, though they were equally “alien nationals” to be deported to the Korean peninsula in the view of Japanese immigration control. In the middle of 1960s, Japanese citizen movements against the Vietnam War took their activities to protest against the Japanese immigration control and detention centers. To dissolve the Ōmura Camp and to liberate Korean detainees became their cause of movements, for the Ōmura Camp was considered as a physical apparatus of totalitarian oppression.

Other studies managed to understand the radical change of postwar Japan’s immigration control policy just in a series of social reformations executed by the initiative of General Headquarters (GHQ). However, compared to other major reformations led by GHQ, such as the educational reform, the land reform, the labor union reform, and the constitu-
tional amendment, the reformation of the immigration control policy and border management system has garnered less attention among scholars. It was simply believed that the Immigration Control Order of 1951, which provided a basic framework for the post-war Japanese immigration control system, declared a brand-new immigration policy and had little to do with the political prosperities of pre-war days.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki points out that such kind of view which was shared among scholars overlooked an essential element: the draft of the new immigration control order was carefully framed by the mutual cooperation between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and Japanese officials in the face of the impending crisis of the Cold War. According to her critical analysis of the history of the Japan’s border control policy, Tessa Morris-Suzuki stresses that the experiences of war in Japan were comprehended as an insurmountable abyss or a gap which resulted in a discontinuity between the prewar and the postwar period. Yoshikuni Igarashi shows people in postwar Japan struggled to find out the way how to understand what they experienced (and what they lost) in the war, by focusing the fragments of wartime memories left in the postwar Japan’s cultural production and social strategies. Lori Watt provides a suggestive overview of “human remnants of Japan’s empire” through an analysis of how the “returnees” (hikiagesha), those who moved back “home” from the former colonies, were served important roles in postwar Japan’s society after the empire collapsed. Hyun Mooam insists that the reorganization of the postwar Japanese immigration control reflected the process of the collapse of the empire into a nation state. Yasuhiko Hikichi maintains that, from a geopolitical viewpoint, the Ōmura Camp contributed to the Japanese government’s policy of expelling the colonized people from Japanese society. From such viewpoints, it is possible to describe that the Ōmura Camp functioned not only as a waiting place for detainees’ deportation, but also as a symbolic remnant of the wartime/colonial memories with encompassing a conflict between what wanted to remember and what wanted to forget in post war Japan. That is to say, many layers of social contradictions in postwar Japan
were accumulated thickly in the site of the Ōmura Camp and they are still left to be analyzed using the tomographic method.

**History of the Sasebo Repatriation Center 1945–1947: From “Reception Center” to “Deportation Center”**

*Repatriation of Japanese and Korean citizens*

In early September 1945, the number of Koreans awaiting repatriation rapidly increased. Those who hurried to return to Korea in the early post-war period included unskilled laborers and Korean soldiers released from conscription. Beginning in October 1945, 3,000 people per day descended upon the port of Hakata. In that period, when a full political system for the occupation had not yet been created, repatriation of Koreans was complicated. Hence, repatriation was shouldered by independently-built Korean organizations, which negotiated directly with ship companies and the Ministry of Transport to secure ships as well as demanded that the Japanese authorities arrange trains to carry Koreans to harbors from all over Japan. Through their actions, between August and November 1945, no less than 800,000 Koreans returned to their home country. Of those, 525,000 were irregular returnees; the remaining 275,000 were formally repatriated.

Formal repatriation of Koreans by the Japanese government began in September 1945. Ships departed from Hakata, took on Japanese in Busan, returned to port, and headed for Korea again. Formal repatriation of Koreans during that time was intimately connected to the repatriation of Japanese from the southern part of the Korean Peninsula and occurred via the government only from Hakata and Sasebo. Therefore, there was a constant chaotic rush of people into both ports. For that reason, in practice, informal repatriation overwhelmingly exceeded formal repatriation. In the end, repatriation of Koreans in the immediate post-war period was generally accomplished by individual efforts. Despite the haphazardness of this effort, a high and steady number of Koreans were able to return home successfully. In this way, the repatriation of Koreans in the immediate post-war period
co-mingled official and unofficial approaches, and the demarcation between the two was not clear.

Based on orders from GHQ, after 1945, the repatriation of Koreans completely changed from independent returns to “Planned Transportation.” These orders toward the Japanese government created the burden of giving Koreans, Taiwanese, and Ryukyuan opportunities to return to their home countries. However, the returnees were strictly limited to having 1,000 Yen in their possession and no more than 250 pounds of luggage, making Koreans insecure in their post-return lives and reducing the number of applicants for repatriation. To increase interest, GHQ implemented registration procedures such as the “Registration of Koreans, Chinese, Ryukyans and Formosans” (SCAPIN-746, February 17, 1946), which stated that those who failed to register with GHQ or depart within the time frame specified would lose the privilege of repatriation at the Japanese government’s expense. As a result, while 647,000 people registered, of whom 514,060 were repatriation candidates, only a few attempted to return to their home country. The process of switching Korean repatriation-related initiatives from local authorities to the central government did not facilitate simple repatriation, and operation of the system by the Japanese government did not promote genuineness; control and operation by Koreans within Japan truly allowed for the establishment of the Korean repatriation system.

The Foundation of “Smuggled Korean Camps”

For Koreans in the immediate post-war period, “accommodation” referred to temporarily staying somewhere for the purpose of returning to the Korean Peninsula. However, with the re-entry of Koreans, which increased around 1946, “smuggled Korean camps” were founded with the intention of forcing Koreans to repatriate. One case of public order control that was related to Koreans was the Cholera Order issued on June 12, 1946, which was a GHQ countermeasure against the outbreak of ships carrying large quantities of cholera patients from the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese government accommodated all illegal immigrants at Sasebo Repatriation Aid Stations and made individual decisions regarding sending them home. The
port of Sasebo was designated as a cholera quarantine port, and exclusive “illegal immigrant” camps were created to accommodate arrested stowaways. Thus, stowaways were all transported to the Hario camp in Sasebo, facilitating a unified repatriation system.\(^{13}\) Additionally, the cholera epidemic on the Korean Peninsula caused an influx of Korean stowaways, which were considered to be a threat to occupation policies. GHQ stated, in regard to the flood of Koreans, “An influx of Koreans is a threat to the occupation and the Japanese people. The presence of these immigrants is likely to spread cholera and typhus.”\(^{14}\)

During this period, several accommodation spots were established for Koreans arrested as illegal immigrants. According to the GHQ memorandum, Sasebo Repatriation Aid Stations were designated for the transportation of smuggled Koreans. In addition, the Karatsu camp in the Saga prefecture and the Kanezaki camp in the Fukuoka prefecture were used for Korean detention.\(^{15}\) At the Kanezaki Village camp in the Fukuoka prefecture, approximately 300 inmates died of indigestion and malnourishment between July 24 and September 15, 1946.\(^{16}\) Conditions at the camp were poor as storehouses were used as lodgings, and people slept with nothing more than blankets they had brought themselves atop boards on concrete floors. Inmates were fed crackers; however, because this was insufficient nutrition, they would also eat food they had brought themselves.

The foregoing confirms that the establishment of the smuggled Korean camps both accompanied and reinforced the functions of operating the Korean repatriation system. From the perspective of Japanese authorities and GHQ, establishment of the camps eased control of the stowaways, and intervention via police power was justified. However, the reality of the camps demonstrated that the system of control over the stowaways was graduated and imperfect. Among the camps themselves, only the Hario camp in Sasebo was under the leadership of the central government; management processes there were not unified. Generally speaking, the smuggled Korean camps of this period were spaces for temporarily housing illegal immigrants, and they were not fit to be turned into a full-scale immigrant housing system. However, an apparatus was created for implementing repatriation; there-
fore, the creation of a space for enclosing stowaways and isolating them from society was vitally important to the later development of the camps.

The Impact of the Korean War on the Immigration Control System in Japan: 1948–1952

The Korean War and the Ōmura detention camp

In 1946, the mass repatriation of Koreans from Japan largely came to an end, with approximately 600,000 Koreans remaining in Japan. Those Koreans vigorously engaged in various political activities including demanding cultural autonomy through ethnic education and joining the Japanese Communist Party; as such, the Japanese government became increasingly concerned about related public order issues. In addition, the state of affairs in the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War deteriorated, which steadily strengthened the anti-communist attitudes of SCAP. In 1946, illegal immigrants were regularly deported from Japan, but no clear guidelines were developed for how to identify an immigrant as illegal. Starting in approximately 1948, a notable trend appeared toward linking illegal immigrants and communism. An SCAP document dated March 10, 1949 stated that illegal immigration to Japan was a method used by spies and subversive agents who were bent on destruction to enter the country. The establishment of the North and South Korean governments in 1948 further raised—or amplified—SCAP’s fears, leading to substantial measures concerning Zainichi Koreans. These included closures of Korean schools, crackdowns on displays of the North Korean flag, and dissolutions of Korean groups. The Korean Peninsula’s division and the Korean War’s outbreak were directly reflected in the anti-communist precautions taken through immigration control.

Meanwhile, the war resulted in a new influx of Korean immigrants to Japan and, because forced repatriation was impossible, the Japanese government sought to implement countermeasures to address the need for public order in and intelligence on this ethnic community, which increased as the war evolved. For the time being, SCAP and the Japanese government
decided to intern the refugees as illegal immigrants in the Hario Detention Center. Wartime refugees’ migrations are often far more about survival than politics, but these circumstances were not considered in domestic Japanese policies. At the time of the Korean War, the legal category of “refugee” was not recognized in Japan; therefore, foreigners entering the country were required to have passports, and those who did not were treated as illegal immigrants and interned in the Hario Detention Center.

At that time, Sasebo was the only domestic port used for non-Japanese deportation. In actuality, this was a port primarily utilized to deport Koreans, which shows that Sasebo played a large role in non-Japanese deportation operations. The records also clearly show that Sasebo held a vital position in the essential processes of both the interning and deporting of Koreans by post-war Japan immigration control. In December 1950, at the outbreak of the Korean War, the Hario Detention Center in Sasebo was relocated to Ōmura because the National Police Reserve was to be housed on the Hario Detention Center’s grounds, and the Ōmura detention camp was created to take over Hario’s functions. Overall, the Kyushu region surrounding Hario had become a candidate for the facilities needed to rearm Japan. GHQ and Japan initially planned to relocate the detention camp to Hiko Sima (i.e., to the city of Shimonoseki) and not to Ōmura. However, because of the large number of Koreans living in Shimonoseki in 1950, planners thought that the city was unsuitable for housing the deported Koreans. The new camp’s location was determined by the conditions the detention center had to offer including avoiding escape issues by ensuring prison containment far from transportation as opposed to more convenient geographical locations in terms of transportation links. In other words, security-related problems with transportation were considered more important than those of ideal geographical or traffic conditions. This appears to have led to the decision to relocate the detainees to the Ōmura camp.

The Category of “Excluded Alien”: The Legal Basis for Deportation

The original impetus for the Ōmura detention center’s creation was a SCAP memorandum in September 1950. That same directive pointed out
flaws in the Japanese government's management of—and mechanisms to control—illegal immigration, noting that “processing centers necessary for taking into custody persons arrested for illegally entering the country must not be correctional facilities, nor national, nor a segment of the municipal police or any lower branch of it.” SCAP asked that immigration control mechanisms be a separate jurisdictional matter and as such completely different from the Japanese police’s operations. Thus, the Ōmura detention camp was established, on SCAP orders, as the primary detainment camp for illegal immigrants. The Korean War provided the ultimate impetus for the creation of a structured immigration bureau in Japan. One direct consequence was the enactment of immigration control commands in 1951. The June 1950 Korean War outbreak intensified the need to unify immigration operations, which had been decentralized up to that point. The joint concerns of the Japanese government and SCAP about immigration control led to concentrated efforts to establish a unified immigration organization to handle deportation issues.

The Ōmura camp began its operations under the strong influence of Nicholas D. Collaer, a GHQ official who had been previously engaged by the United States (U.S.) Immigration Service as an expert in deportation matters and who played a critical role in the creation of Japan’s 1951 Immigration Control Order. Collaer traveled to Japan after receiving MacArthur’s order and exercised strong influence over the drafting of legislation addressing deportation. Collaer had assisted with Mexican-American border security in the U.S. and, during the war, had been appointed as general manager of the first Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Wartime Enemy Alien Detention Center. He worked in the detention section of the INS and was responsible for supervising all INS internment camps throughout the U.S. Collaer’s position as a supervisor of internment camps provided considerable opportunities to formulate his ideas on the issues of migration in post-war Japan. During his stay in Japan, Collaer designed a framework of immigration policy that has had a lasting impact on post-war Japanese immigration control. For example, the category of “excluded alien” that Collaer proposed for Japan directly reflected one of the categories found in the McCarran-
Walter Act. Collaer emphasized that, although Japan needed a new immigration control system, its system should not solely apply to Koreans but also to all subversive elements, regardless of nationality. The active imaginations of Collaer and SCAP policymakers caused their anxieties about “subversive elements” to increase further.

When a detainee in the Ōmura camp was connected to left-wing movements, such as the League of Koreans in Japan or the Japanese Communist Party, their release was disallowed, and they were forced to emigrate. Conversely, when a detainee was connected with “anti-communist movements,” they were sometimes exempted from deportation. The records are unclear as to whether or not ideological surveys were conducted within the detention camp; however, officials clearly considered “thoughts” to be a factor in their decisions on whether or not to release or deport detainees. In addition, during the Korean War, SCAP suspected adult male illegal immigrants of draft evasion and, without releasing detainees domestically in Korea, used deportations from Japan to augment the American and South Korean forces. After the outbreak of the Korean War, at the same time that Japan grappled with illegal immigration, the country’s policies were being influenced by American wartime strategies.

The Ōmura detention camp was an embodiment of the state of affairs in the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War—a microcosmos that reflected those external circumstances. In particular, as an ideological confrontation, the Korean War greatly influenced the Ōmura detention camp. SCAP’s principal objective during this war was the prevention of a communist invasion. For this reason, the occupying army’s discussions of communism, radical agents, and Korean illegal immigrants awakened fears of the latent danger of Japan being seized by illegal immigrants who were spies and subversive activists. The illegal immigrant investigation center proposed by SCAP included intelligence gathering through direct interviews of all illegal immigrants. However, apart from personal thoughts and beliefs, official policies left almost no room for spy activities through the geographical transfer of individuals during the Korean War. For refugees transferred back to Korea during the war, the problem was not to determine which ideological system
to choose, as the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea demanded; these individuals’ struggle was simply to stay alive.

In addition, while directly engaged in dealing with illegal immigrants, the Japanese police were not limited to matters of public safety. All information was placed into the hands of those in charge, and public safety was used as a pretext for strengthening government control. Japan’s government repeatedly applied the phrase “radical elements” to Koreans and all left-wing ideological groups involved in any incidents. The phrases “anticommunist,” “radical elements,” and “smuggled Koreans” were used to rationalize the legitimacy of police control. SCAP and the police made any individuals considered capable of opposing the existing system the subject of their investigations and direct supervision. In short, the authorities suspected that everyone was capable of planning a revolution. However, given the on-going situation, officials seemed uninterested in determining whether or not any single individual possessed that ability. During the Korean War, refugees were detained as illegal immigrants in the Hario detention center on SCAP’s orders, which subsequently influenced the conditions of the Ōmura detention camp. The Korean War was used as an opportunity to transform the Ōmura camp from a place merely to detain illegal immigrants to a physical space with political undertones.

New Aspects of Japan’s Immigration Control: After the Allied Occupation Era

*Changes in the Renovation and Housing at the Ōmura Camp*

Japan recovered its sovereignty after the implementation of the Treaty of San Francisco on April 28, 1952. Immigration control, which had been regulated under the Allied Forces, was also given back to Japanese authority. Although border control of occupied Japan was executed by the GHQ, the Treaty of San Francisco restored Japan’s control of its border. Japan’s sovereignty recovery was also declared in the Immigration Control Order of 1952, which was partially amended in accordance with the first article of “Law on the Effect of Directives Concerning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, based
on Orders Given Following the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration” (Law No.126 of 1952) as follows: the term “aliens” should be univocally understood as persons such as “non-Japanese nationals.” As a result, Korean residents in Japan were forced to abandon their Japanese nationality and subsequently became targets of the revised Immigration Control Order.

The Bureau of Emigration and Immigration, which had been an external bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was transferred to the Ministry of Justice and reorganized as the “Immigration Bureau.” According to the Ministry of Justice, the transfer of the immigration authority was approved based on four points: (1) Investigation of an alien’s landing, status, and violation is a legal service, which examines the specific legal requirements and gives a certain status to aliens. (2) The procedure of deportation has so-called quasi-judiciary character. (3) Alien registration is related to the legal service of nationality or family register, whose authority belongs to the Ministry of Justice. (4) Deportation is a crucial limitation of the human rights of an alien, which is why the Ministry of Justice, “the champion of human rights,” should be a competent authority.

The Japanese government had always planned to utilize the facilities of the former Ōmura Naval Base for establishing the immigration detention center. During the March 27, 1951 meeting, the government committee for the Bureau of Immigration reported that the Ōmura detention center was “... originally built as the commanding office of the Navy. The buildings are grand structures but not suitable for use as a detention camp. Unless they have the necessary equipment for the detention facilities, detainees would easily escape from the center and might break out in insurgences in the future.” However, the Ōmura detention facilities did not proceed with restoration until Japan recovered its sovereignty.

In 1953, the South Korean government refused to accept Korean repatriates to their homeland, stating that they were “violators of criminal laws and ordinances”; as such, they sent them back to Japan. Hence, the Ōmura detention camp was in urgent need of an expanded capacity. The major improvements to the Ōmura detention camp were completed in September 1953, and the Ōmura began its full operation with new facilities. When the
Ōmura detention camp had first opened in December 1950, they utilized the main building of the former 21st Naval Aeronautical Technology Institution, after partial repair, and its capacity was then 690. The new detention center expanded its capacity to 1,000 people. At the beginning, the exterior fences were made of wood once used in the Hario detention camp. It was then replaced with fencing made of reinforced concrete, and the surveillance system was intensified. All improvements to the detention facilities were carried out to handle what was viewed as a new political problem.

The official repatriation program was executed seven times before it ended in March 1952, on the eve of the Treaty of San Francisco coming into force. At that time, 3,633 Koreans who were interned in the Ōmura were transported to Busan. When Japan was under the Allies’ occupation, the South Korean government supported all the repatriates being admitted. However, it changed its policy after the Treaty of San Francisco: 125 of 410 Korean repatriates who arrived in Busan were refused entry into South Korea, and they were sent “back to Japan.” Those who were “deported to Japan” were labeled as “violators of criminal laws and ordinances” because they had been in Japan before the Pacific War came to an end. When the first Japan-South Korean talks ended in collapse, the South Korean government insisted that they could not accept Korean repatriates because the legal status of “(South) Koreans in Japan (Zainichi-Kanjin)” remained unestablished. Korean repatriates who were “deported to Japan” claimed to be free without reservation, but their claims were never approved, and they were committed to the Ōmura camp once again.

In October 1952, four months after the suspension of the repatriation program, the number of detainees interned in the Ōmura camp surpassed 1,000, and it reached 1,300 in 1954. The Immigration Bureau constructed a new detention center immediately, but it soon overflowed with Korean detainees. As an urgent countermeasure against the influx, the Hamamatsu branch of the Yokohama Immigration Center was additionally established on the property of the Shizuoka Prison in Hamamatsu in December 1954. However, the overflow issue was never solved, and the matter of long-term internment persisted. The Japanese government focused on long-term
internment in terms of the highly increasing expenses. During a judicial committee meeting held on June 16, 1955, the matter was discussed, and the committee stated that “it is necessary to obtain an international agreement for the matter to be solved completely.” The Japanese government came to recognize that the long-term internment of detainees in detention centers was a diplomatic issue between Japan and South Korea.

Prior to the official talks between the two countries, which were supposed to resume on March 1, 1958, the Japanese government and the Rhee Syngman administration reached a mutual agreement on the “Release of foreign nationals being subject to internment” on December 31, 1953. The agreement stated that Japanese fishermen interned in Busan and Korean detainees in the Ōmura camp and the Hamamatsu branch would be released by each government without reservation. Approximately 950 Japanese fishermen were sent back to Japan, 1,260 “illegally immigrated” Korean detainees were forcibly deported to South Korea, and other Koreans labeled as “violators of criminal laws and ordinances” (with most of them accused of offending the alien registration law) were released in Japan. In post-occupation Japan, the domestic and diplomatic struggles of those seeking the ambiguous status of “Koreans in Japan” greatly influenced the operation of the Ōmura camp, which had been initially established for the practical purpose of sending back “illegally immigrated” aliens. While the circumstances surrounding the Ōmura camp changed gradually, its primordial function changed drastically.

Following the instruction of the Ministry of Justice Correction Bureau, approximately 50 solitary cells and a new isolation ward building were added to the Ōmura camp in September 1953. The immigration authority decided to “admit those who committed acts of damage or destruction, and those who were considered to be interned in solitary to the isolated wards.” The Ōmura camp did not adopt the segregated internment policy until the new isolated ward building was settled in 1953. Koreans, Chinese, and other Western nationals were taken into the same detention chambers together. However, the camp later began to separate detainees by sex and ethnicity in 1953 due to quarrels between men and women and ethnic conflicts. This new detention policy was contradicted by the Immigration Bureau’s official
view: The Ōmura detention camp was opened for the purpose of “providing a wharf for the repatriation, and repatriates were to be made to stay together in a large room, without considering the sexes.”

Notably, conflicts and troubles arose frequently at the Ōmura camp. After the outbreak of the Korean War, there were severe conflicts between the so-called “Pro-North” group (repatriates who wished to be returned home to the People's Republic) and the “Pro-South” group (zealous adherents of the Rhee Syngman administration). A bloody conflict, known as the “Jang Dong-Gon Assassination Incident,” happened on November 18, 1955: A political argument between Jang Dong-Gun (Pro-North) and Yi Man-dok (Pro-South) escalated into Jang Dong-Gun being clubbed to death by Pro-South activists. After the turmoil, 69 Pro-North detainees were transferred to the annex building on December 31, 1956. However, the political and ideological collisions did not cease and even became more complicated. North-South conflicts as well as internal quarrels among Pro-North members were reported such as the flag of North Korea being torn away, Pro-North detainees being assaulted by Pro-South activists, and a detainee who withdrew his desire to return to North Korea was lynched by leaders of the Pro-North group.

There were also conflicts between the “illegally immigrated” detainees and those labeled as “violators of criminal laws and ordinances,” because they were often from different districts of the Korean Peninsula and their language, accents, and customs were unfamiliar to each other. Park Soon-Jo, a former detainee in the Ōmura internment, recalls his experience there: “Even though all detainees were of the same national origin, some spoke Japanese and the others Korean. The situation provoked them to the cruelest of quarrels against each other. It would not have happened if they were interned among thoroughly foreign people (such as persons of Western nationality).” Hence, the political confrontation in the Korean Peninsula had negative effects on the lives of detainees at the Ōmura. Kim Dong-Chun points out that all the political, economic, and social aspects of the Korean Peninsula were produced, without exception, by the Armistice Regime of 1953. The same situation was noted in all Japanese immigration policies.
from 1953 on, which reflected the deep diplomatic changes in the East Asian region.

Due to the long suspension of the repatriation programs from the Ōmura camp, the immigration authority planted more detention centers all across Japan. For example, the Okazaki detention center at the Nagoya Immigration Center was founded in March 1954; the Hamamatsu branch of the Yokohama Immigration Center, located in the corner of the Hamamatsu Prison, opened in December 1954. Hirosumi Kondo, former chief of the Haneda Immigration Control Office, revealed that “there was a notification from the government that four or five other detention centers would be needed to maintain public security.” Some locations, such as Saijo in Ehime or Shimonoseki in Yamaguchi, were considered as new detention centers; however, the site of the Hamamatsu Prison was selected because of its vacant spaces. They also planned to create a new immigration office in Osaka because there was only the Kobe Immigration Center in the greater area of Kinki, which had one of the densest populations in Japan. It was reported that fundamental reorganization and restructuring of the immigration centers were required in that area: In 1956, 32% of “aliens” in Japan lived in the greater area of Kinki (Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Shiga, Nara, and Wakayama), which verified that another office in the center of Kinki was needed to perform proper immigration control in association with relevant authorities.

Fundamental reorganization and restructuring of the immigration centers were also required because the Immigration Bureau stated that “a rapid increase of the application for re-entry permission submitted by Koreans who have been living in Japan since the pre-War period changes the character of the immigration control service, and its weight moves gradually from the port areas to the inland areas.” Initially, the local branches of the Immigration Bureau were deployed to conduct economic activities in the port areas, especially in proportion to the capacities and scales of seaports. For that reason, the immigration service, as far as the status of residence and as with the application for re-entry permission for “aliens,” was not fully responsible for the immigration control policy in Japan.
changing circumstances within immigration control moved Japan’s immigration policy into another stage.

Public Movements Against the Ōmura Detention Camp

Petitions for the improvement of detainees’ circumstances were persistently submitted to the Japanese government under the leadership of Korean organizations in Japan. During the winter months, living supplies were delivered to Korean detainees and their families in the detention centers all over Japan including at the Ōmura detention camp. By 1955, approximately 1,600 detainees had spent the better part of their lives inside the Ōmura including 650 women and 200 children. Chongryon, or the General Association of (North) Korean Residents in Japan, claimed that 370 of 1,685 Korean detainees inside the Ōmura should be released immediately because they had been in Japan before September 2, 1945. They also insisted that those 370 Koreans were either forcibly recruited workers or conscripted wartime soldiers and, as such, their release would be justified, and their deportation should be withdrawn for both legal and humane reasons. Chongryon also submitted a claim stating that the other 1,263 Koreans, who were considered to be “illegally immigrated,” should also be allowed to stay in Japan because their livelihood had already been established there.

Moreover, Chongryon wanted to help draft dodgers and political/military refugees from South Korea who “strongly wished to be back home in North Korea because their deportation to the Rhee Syngman administration would obviously be fatal.” Chongryon eagerly committed to the relief campaign of Koreans, especially those who “strongly wished to be back home in DPRK,” including “students who want to study at North Korea’s universities” or “engineers who want to engage in the Homeland Restoration Projects of North Korea.” Chongryon’s strategy to gain the release of Korean detainees from the Ōmura was to negotiate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the planning of the new repatriation program. However, Mindan, or the (South) Korean Residents Union in Japan stated, regarding the deportation policy for Koreans, that “it is to be regretted that Koreans
are treated in a discriminative way,” and they held the “Public Meeting to Protect the Rights of Fellow Nationals” in various regions in Japan. Public movements led by the (North and South) Korean organizations regarding the Ōmura camp were aimed at highlighting the unjustness of the Japanese immigration policy and eliminating Koreans’ fear of deportation. Furthermore, those organizations tried to promote their own “Homeland Return Project.” Such projects emerged from conflicted ideas of “home” that were reflected by the divided Korean nations. In this manner, the Ōmura was not only a site of discrimination against Koreans in Japan but also a site that harbored the ideological campaign of fellow Koreans’ engagement in their own “Homeland Return Project.”

In an attempt to intervene on behalf of detainees, from August 1958 to March 1959, Pastor Masaharu Oka and Evangelist Peter Rasmussen of the Isahaya Church (a branch of Japan’s Evangelical Lutheran Church of Nagasaki) were sent to the Ōmura camp on religious missions. At the Ōmura, a correspondence course for study of the Bible was organized. Additionally, 170 detainees listened to the nationwide radio program “The Lutheran Hour” and took correspondence lessons through the Lutheran Hour’s Kyushu Center, Fukuoka. Religious activities, such as preaching, Bible study, Bible picture-story shows, and playing hymns, were performed inside the Ōmura. Christian missions at the Ōmura were officially recognized. Immigration authorities regarded the missionary visits as religious activities that were not compelled by the institution of the Ministry of Justice but were rather requested by the detainees’ of their own will. The detainees’ spontaneous activities were permitted; therefore, the Christian missions never breached article 20 of the Constitution of Japan. There were some background matters involved. Notably, Christian missions were positively introduced by the immigration authorities to pacify resentment among Korean detainees at the Ōmura camp, in which serious incidents, such as escapes, (attempted) suicides, injuries, assaults, hunger strikes, and building occupations, were taking place often. Christian missions in the detention center hoped that, through religion, they could avoid having detainees put under sedation.
When Pastor Oka and Evangelist Rasmussen visited the Ōmura, a dismal atmosphere between the Pro-North group and the Pro-South group was ongoing, and detainees’ struggles for better treatment were escalating. Pastor Oka recalls seeing overflowing repatriates to South Korea being interned in the buildings, with married couples segregated from each other and children separated from parents. Repatriates who wished to return to North Korea were isolated in the first detention building because they were regarded as subversive or disturbing elements. In addition, detainees’ freedom of assembly and association as well as their freedoms of expression and action were restrained. Koreans, especially those who wished to return to North Korea, suffered terrible treatment by immigration control officers. Those circumstances were intolerable for the clergy. Pastor Oka and Evangelist Rasmussen expressed concerns and requested better treatment of Koreans interned at the Ōmura camp, which was answered with a notice from immigration authorities, stating that their visits to the center should end immediately. Thus, the Lutheran church’s missions to the Ōmura, which lasted for eight months, came to an end. However, their religious activities left a significant imprint: the clergy were the first outsiders to enter the Ōmura camp and witness the dismal circumstances of internment inside.

On March 31, 1969, 57 members of Betonamu ni heiwa wo! Shimin rengo (also known as “Beheiren”) or the Citizen’s League for Peace in Vietnam, which was led by Minoru Oda, held a mass demonstration against the internment policy of Japan, and they called for the dissolution of the Ōmura camp. It was the first mass demonstration since the detention center had opened, and the participants considered it the “struggle for dismantling the Ōmura camp.” Notably, they never demanded improvements of the detainees’ treatment but rather requested the complete disorganization of detention facilities. From 1969 to 1970, the total number of participants in the demonstrations reached approximately 2,300.

The Japan Evangelical Lutheran Church of Nagasaki, to which Pastor Oka belonged, provided accommodations for Minoru Oka and those members of Beheirein who organized mass demonstrations. Pastor Oka was engaged in the movement for the release of detainees after his missionary works in
the Ōmura were suspended. He also formed the “Association for Protecting Human Rights of Zainichi” (Koreans in Japan) in Nagasaki and became its representative in 1965, continuing his devotion to the support of detainees. Christian churches, which banded together with Pastor Oka, viewed their protest movement against the Ōmura camp as a decisive struggle to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and they collaborated with other citizens’ groups in Nagasaki.

Beheiren began to be engage in the “anti-immigration control system” movements as a result of supporting the “Kim Dong-Hee Refugee Incident.” Kim Dong-Hee (at the age of 27), a sergeant in the South Korean Army who was commanded to join the expeditionary troop to South Vietnam, deserted from the Busan base camp to Japan as a military refugee. Kim was arrested by the Tsushima police for being an “illegal immigrant.” He was subsequently indicted for violation of the Immigration Control Act and sentenced to a year’s imprisonment. While serving his time in the Fukuoka Prison in February 1967, Kim was sent to the Ōmura camp and hoped to be permitted to stay in Japan. However, he realized that it would be almost impossible to acquire permission for residence. Kim then drew up a petition for repatriation to North Korea in his own handwriting as follows: “Of my own free will, I earnestly request to return home to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” It was feared that Kim would receive a death sentence by court-martial if he was deported to South Korea.

Kim Dong-Hee’s predicament became widely known in Japan through his letters posted from within the Ōmura detention camp. The “Supporters’ Association for Kim Dong-Hee” was organized on March 8, 1967, and supporting movements were carried out mainly by the members of Beheiren. Soon after the Supporters’ Association was formed, a complaint consisting of three points was submitted to the Ministry of Justice: 1) Mr. Kim Dong-Hee’s behavior should be fully approved. 2) Deportation to the “Republic of Korea,” which would impose the death penalty on Mr. Kim Dong-Hee, should be objected. 3) Respecting Mr. Kim Dong-Hee’s own will, he should either be recognized as a refugee in Japan or his repatriation to North Korea should be guaranteed. However, actual activities to support Kim were
restricted to those of minor impact such as signature-collecting campaigns. Visitors who requested interviews with Kim Dong-Hee were thoroughly rejected by the Ōmura camp on the pretext of security reasons. The only way to contact him was through letters. In the middle of his lawsuit requesting revocation of the deportation order, Kim was unexpectedly sent on “refugee departure” to the Soviet Union in January 1968. As a result, he was able to enter North Korea via the Soviet Union.

How did the supporters of the public campaign for Kim Dong-Hee, which was led by Beheiren members, evaluate their own attitudes? What kind of meaning or effect resulted from their supporting activities? Ardent participants of the campaign, such as Minoru Oda and Shunsuke Tsurumi, proposed “solidarity of Asian people” through the support of Kim Dong-Hee’s predicament. Shunsuke Tsurumi expressed his idea as follows: “Let us have fellow feelings with the anti-war advocators in the United States; let us admire the Vietnamese people, who were fighting against the overwhelmingly predominant U.S. forces; let us join hands together with people’s protests of their everyday lives in every part of Asia.” Moreover, in his public lecture in July 1968, Shunsuke Tsurumi spoke of the “fundamental crime of the Japanese nation” and the war responsibilities of Japan to Asian people. He stressed that the presence of Chinese, Koreans, and Taiwanese in Japan should always remind us that the fundamental crime of the Japanese nation would not disappear.

However, citizens who took part in the “anti-immigration control system” movements look back upon the days of protest in a positive manner. Eiichi Mori remembers of his participation in mass demonstrations: “In response to our call, I heard the detainees’ voices say ‘thank you,’ I will definitely never forget their voices.” Ikuko Miyazima recalls her memories: “After holding a meeting, we marched for two kilometers from the station to the Ōmura camp. We were singing folk music songs to the accompaniment of young men’s guitars and started to call slogans: ‘Abolish the Ōmura detention camp!’; ‘Recognize the right of asylum!’; and ‘Blow up the horribly changed Immigration Control Act!’ In a country town, passersby stopped walking to look at us, and children were following us by running. University
students coming home for the holidays from Tokyo jumped to join us in the middle while wearing Geta sandals. When we started to march around the wall of the Ōmura camp, I heard a faint voice say, ‘thank you,’ from inside. I could not forget that.”

Manabu Inoue, who reported Beheiren’s “anti-immigration control system” movements, pointed out that many participants lacked even the most fundamental knowledge about the problems of Koreans in Japan. Inoue confessed that “Non-experts in Korean problems protested against ‘the Ōmura,’ and that is my question.”

In this way, the Ōmura was represented as a point of convergence of all struggles, to which every kind of protest movement set its achievement regardless of its political intentions or motivations. For intellectuals who claimed “solidarity with Asian people,” the Ōmura camp was seen as the incarnation of Japan’s war responsibility. For Pastor Oka and his fellow Christian church organizations, the Ōmura was a site for domestic missions, in which relief for detainees should be carried out with humanity. For citizens who took part in demonstrations, the Ōmura was regarded as the breeding ground of discrimination and suppression in the local community, even though they had little knowledge about the Korean detainees. Hence, the multidimensional characteristics of the protest movements toward the Ōmura camp reveal that the Ōmura itself was a complicated phenomenon that was never generalized by a one-sided viewpoint.

The Ōmura was considered as a symptomatic site of contradictions, which reflected the waving tides of domestic and international issues such as the outbreak of the Korean war; the restoration of sovereignty of Japan by the Treaty of San Francisco; the diplomatic difficulty in Japan-South Korea talks; and other changes in the political conditions and circumstances in East Asia at the time. Sentiments against political and diplomatic contradictions in Japan were acted out in the guise of the struggles against the Ōmura camp. Therefore, it could be said that the Ōmura was the “political” aspect and the movements against the Ōmura camp were the “social” aspect. Protest movements against discrimination that erupted in the Ōmura camp were connected to every form of citizen’s movement and relief activity. However,
when the mass movements reached their peak and subsequently began to recede, the problem of the Ōmura became of little concern in Japan.

_The Intersection of “Refugee” Protection and “Stowaway” Detention_

When the Korean War broke out, the Japanese government did not recognize the legal status of refugees. Aliens were required to possess valid passports or other certification documents to enter Japan. Violators of laws or regulations of entry were accused of illegal immigration and sent to the Hario immigration detention center which was later reorganized as the Ōmura detention center. Meanwhile, “Indochinese refugees,” who began entering Japan in 1957, were never regarded as “illegal immigrants” but were accepted into “the Ōmura Temporary Refugees Reception Center.” Most refugees placed at the Reception Center did not possess any identifying documents, such as a passport from their nation of origin or identification cards; however, the Japanese government did not deport them.

The first Indochinese refugees landed in Japan in May of 1957. Because no legislative system for protecting refugees was established in Japan at that time, matters of these refugees were treated individually by government offices and authorities in association with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. The Japanese government placed responsibility for accepting the Indochinese refugees entirely on the private facilities managed by the Japanese Red Cross Society or by religious organizations. Due to the separation of religion from politics, there was no official aid to the private facilities operated by religious organizations, creating a significant financial burden for them. In November 1979, the Refugee Assistance Headquarters was established in the division of the Foundation for the Welfare and Education of the Asian People under commission from the Japanese government. The Himeji Resettlement Promotion Center was then opened in Himeji, Hyogo in December 1979 and the Yamato Resettlement Promotion Center was added in Yamato, Kanagawa in February 1980.

At that time, the acceptance of Indochinese refugees was treated within the general principles of the immigration control policy. According to the Immigration Control Act of 1975, aliens who did not possess a valid passport
were detained in the same vein as stowaways and illegal immigrants. On April 28, 1978, as an interim measure, the Japanese government provided Indochinese refugees with the status of temporary residence, not from the basis of law but rather from cabinet approval, which authorized them to enter and stay in Japan, albeit with restricted conditions.

When Japan approved the ratification of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1981, the former Immigration Control Act was amended and renamed. The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was then enacted in January 1982. One month later, the Ōmura Temporary Refugees Reception Center was opened for the protection of Indochinese refugees. Temporary landing was institutionalized under the guidance of the “Landing Permission for Temporary Refuge” (Article 18-2, Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act of 1982). Thus, Indochinese refugees who arrived in Japan after January 1981 were issued permission for landing when their statuses as refugees were recognized, even if they did not possess passports and visa documents.62 The issue of Indochinese refugees was repeatedly reported as a serious concern in the news media.63 On the contrary, the problem of the Ōmura camp was left behind. On April 18 and 19 of 1977, just when Indochinese refugees arrived in Japan, the Investigation Committee of the Ōmura camp (consisting of 15 members) visited to survey conditions inside the facility.64

The Investigation Committee reported the following on April 18, 1977: “The Ōmura camp was just a ‘prison without a definite term.’ There were 102 Korean detainees inside (as of April 1, 1977), with 27 Koreans in long-term internment from over a year up to four years. Detainees spent their ordinary lives having their human rights, such as visits by family, friends, and supporters, severely restricted. In addition, private letters were censored, detainees were forced into interviews with the consul of “South Korea,” inappropriate pressure was placed on detainees to withdraw their lawsuits, and requests by detainees for improved treatment were rejected.”65 When a lawyer visited the camp to conduct interviews, detainees were always accompanied by detention officers, even though they were interned due to the administrative procedure of “deportation” and not because of crim-
inal activity. The Ōmura detention center insisted that “deportation is an administrative treatment, and there is no need to apply the code of criminal procedure.” They stressed that no one, including lawyers, was permitted to interview detainees without an officer’s attendance.\textsuperscript{66} Roju Yoshitome, an Investigation Committee member, depicted the camp’s atmosphere as follows: “On our second visit, we saw the first article of an interview instruction titled ‘Speaking Japanese is recommended.’ On our third visit, the article was changed to ‘Speak Japanese as a rule.’ We feel that the Ōmura detention camp became a prison year by year.”\textsuperscript{67} The Investigation Committee summarized the problems of the Ōmura camp, which were determined during their visits, and submitted a petition for improvement to Hajime Hukuda, the Minister of Justice. In reality, the problems that the Investigation Committee pointed out were not “problems” at all for the Immigration authority. Moreover, the Investigation Committee’s “investigation” had no proven authority; it was merely a “petition and request.”\textsuperscript{68}

The “Outline of the Bill to Revise the Immigration Control Act” was publicly announced to accept “Indochinese refugees” in Japan and to amend a part of the Immigration Control Act of that time due to the ratification of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The primary purpose of this bill was to add articles that would update the domestic acts and ordinances related to the immigration policy. In the process of discussion, a debate was requested to add articles “to confirm the ambiguous status of Koreans and Taiwanese who belonged to the Japanese nation in the pre-war period and have lost Japanese nationality pursuant to the Treaty of Peace with Japan yet still reside in Japan.” Namely, the necessity of a legal definition for refugees and other aliens living in Japan emerged from the process of reorganizing the immigration control system. However, opinions within the government had not been coordinated. Articles concerning the status of refugees were not discussed openly and were detached from other parts of the bill.\textsuperscript{69} Accordingly, the issues of “refugees” and “aliens” in Japan were segregated in the legal discussion.

The Japanese government accepted refugees from the Indochinese Peninsula on the condition that they had sufficient reason to be recog-
nized as “refugees.” As for refugees from the Korean Peninsula, in light of the geographic dynamism, there was no distinction between people who escaped from the Indochinese Wars and those who escaped from the Korean War. “Refugees” always aroused sympathies among Japanese society and were represented as objects of humanitarian aid. In contrast, “illegal immigrants” aroused antipathies among Japanese society and were represented as the subject of disorder.

Who then is a “refugee?” Who is an “illegal immigrant?” On what principles have these categories been defined to a person who escaped from another place? The answer would be “institutional.” In other words, these categories are unilaterally constructed by the immigration control system or social institutions in Japan: A person who was detained in the Ōmura camp could be called an “illegal immigrant,” while someone who was transferred to the Ōmura Temporary Refugees Reception Center could be called a “refugee.” This reflects how “illegal immigrant” is not only a term but a form of exclusion of “the others” in Japan in the guise of the immigration control system.

Conclusion
This paper clarified the influence of the Japanese Government and GHQ on the immigration control system after the post-war period. Although an immigration detention center often tends to be considered no more than an Immigration Bureau-affiliated institution, detention centers allowed Japanese officials to enforce “deportation” smoothly and were essential to the establishment of a deportation system under a series of flaws that led to deportation by accommodation, which was initially the border control’s basis for the immigration control system after World War II in Japan. Particularly during the Korean War, Japanese officials and GHQ utilized the Ōmura detention camp to intern Korean deportees. With this specific mission, the center increasingly came to symbolize the complexity of international relations in East Asia after the collapse of the Japanese empire.

Through a diachronic point of view, this study reveals the functional change of detention camps in successive periods. Use of the Ōmura deten-
tion center began in the post-war period in Japan, and its function varied, depending on each era. Changes at the Ōmura detention camp included three main processes:

1) The first stage included when the so-called “smuggled Korean camp” shifted to a central immigration control system, which reinforced the deportation of Koreans in Japan. This was in line with the repatriation support system, and the change was promoted by the cholera epidemic in the Korean Peninsula at the end of 1946. The Hario camp (located at Sasebo), the former Ōmura camp, took central control of illegal immigrants.

2) During the second stage, the process involved a reception center transferring individuals to a deportation center founded in Hario by the National Police Reserve during the outbreak of the Korean War. This camp found that “waiting for repatriation” carried the best role of the immigration control policy in the turbulent political period following the Cold War, a period which reflected the international environment and the process of independence from colonialism.

3) The third stage occurred after Korean residents in Japan left behind their Japanese nationality after the Peace Treaty. On the one hand, since the immigration control duties were carried out under new Japanese sovereignty, the Ōmura camp was treated as a political issue in Japanese and Korean relations. However, on the other hand, the Ōmura camp became a central issue in the local citizens’ movement. In this study, I describe the Ōmura camp image, which had previously been portrayed in conventional historical research as only “the spot of discrimination,” by examining the positioning of the immigrant camp within the larger immigration control administration and by capturing the function of an immigration camp in a different time period.
Notes

1. The Ōmura Immigration Detention Camp was renamed “the Ōmura Immigration Center” in 1993.
12. SCAPIN 1015 (June 12, 1946) GC, Subj.: Suppression of Illegal Entry into Japan.
19. Ibid.
25. Statement of Nobuemon Oka in the record of the House of Councilors Oversight of Administration, Session 10, no. 3 (March 27, 1951).
29. The Yokohama detention center was originally established in December 1951, in the throes of the Korean War, to detain the miss-ship persons, except for Koreans and Chinese.
30. Remarks of Fujio Ushida, secretary in the Ministry of Justice and Director-General of the Immigration Bureau. See the record of the House of Representatives Committee on Judicial Affairs, Session 22, no. 21 (June 16, 1955).
36. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
42. Ibid., 261.

44. *Ibid.* According to the report, there were 1,633 inmates confined in the Ōmura Camp as of January 23, 1956. 400 inmates out of them were permitted to reside in Japan before September 2, 1945. From 1951 to 1956, 38 inmates were born in the camp. From 1952 to 1956, 17 inmates (3 women and 14 men) died in the camp and 2 out of them were unable to determine their cause of death; 284 inmates were under age 15, who have never received formal education in the camp. 23 inmates were inpatients, including 14 patients who have been suffering from mental illness for a long time.


50. The Japanese government was averse to participating in the Refugees Convention. See the following statement of Akira Shigemitsu, a government delegate, in the House of Representatives Committee on Cabinet, Session 58, no. 23 (April 19, 1968): “According to the Refugees Convention (adopted in 1951), as a result of the case that occurred before January 1, 1951, the coverage of the time for a limited number treaty limits it to Europe; this treaty is not a treaty for world-famous refugees and is primarily aimed at European relief.”

51. Masaharu Oka *op.cit.*, 10.


59. The Indochina refugees, commonly known as “the boat people” in Japan, contained Vietnamese refugees from the Laos-Cambodian Civil War, as well as the Vietnam War refugees. In 1975, the number of the Indochina refugees who entered into Japan was recorded 126. In 1977, it counted to 247 and after the following years it rapidly increased to quadruple: from 1978 to 1981, approximately 1,000 people had come to take refuge in Japan annually.


64. The board of the investigation was consisted of lawyers, the member of the House of Representatives, the authors, and scholars.


67. Ibid.


69. The Bill on Arrangement of Immigration Control Act and Related Acts to Accedence of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee (Bill of B) was supposed to applied only to refugees, while the Bill for Partial Amendments to the Immigration Control Order (Bill of A) aimed to control foreign residents in Japan, excluding refugees.

70. The acceptance of Indochinese refugees in Japan was carried out as a diplomatic pose to respond to the urgent requests from the international community. Therefore, the acceptance policy of Indochinese refugees did not mean that Japan have already had the well-established legal system or social aids for the refugee protection.

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